The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance:  Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation by Katz, Avery
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 89 Issue 2 
1990 
The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory 
and the Law of Contract Formation 
Avery Katz 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract 
Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215 (1990). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol89/iss2/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE STRATEGIC STRUCTURE OF OFFER 
AND ACCEPTANCE: GAME THEORY AND 
THE LAW OF CONTRACT FORMATION 
Avery Katz* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE COSTS OF A CONVENTIONAL 
APPROACH............................................. 216 
II. THE BARGAINING PROBLEM IN LAW AND EcONOMICS • 225 
A. The Relation Between Substantive Legal Rules and 
Bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 
B. The Effect of Contract Formation Rules on 
Bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 
III. A SKETCHY SURVEY OF THE EcONOMICS OF 
BARGAINING • . • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . • • • • • • • • • • • • 232 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH: 
SOME CAVEATS........................................ 243 
A. Selecting the Best Formal Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 
B. Limitations of the Game-Theoretic Approach . . . . . . . . 24 7 
V. A FuLL INFORMATION MODEL: ACCEPTANCE BY 
SILENCE • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • . • • • • • • • . • • • 249 
A. The Doctrinal Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 
B. The Formal Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 
C. A Variation on the Model: Subjective Intention To 
Accept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 
D. Comments on the Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 
VI. AN IMPERFECT INFORMATION MODEL: STANDARDIZED 
FORM CONTRACTS..................................... 272 
A. The Doctrinal Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274 
B. Baird and Weisberg's Defense of the Duty To Read . 277 
• Assistant Professor of Law and of Economics, University of Michigan. B.A. 1980, Michi-
gan; A.M. 1983, J.D. 1985, Ph.D. 1986, Harvard. - Ed. I am grateful to Ian Ayres, Mark 
Bagnoli, Richard Craswell, Sharon Feldman, Richard Lempert, Richard Pildes, Roberta Ro-
mano, Joel Seligman, Steven Shavell, Robert Thomas, James J. White, and seminar participants 
at Michigan, Georgetown, Chicago, Harvard, and Yale Law Schools for helpful comments, and 
to the Cook Fund of the University of Michigan Law School and the Center for Studies in Law, 
Economics, and Public Policy at Yale Law School for financial support. 
\ 215 
216 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:215 
C. A Formal Model of the Duty To Read . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282 
D. Comments on the Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290 
CONCLUSION ••• -. • • . • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • . • • • • • • • • • • 293 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE COSTS OF A 
CONVENTIONAL APPROACH 
;The purpose of this article is to promote a particular research pro-
gram; namely, the use of game theory to analyze the law of contract 
formation. Although I will often simply speak of offer and acceptance 
in my discussion, I mean to refer to a broader set of issues than are 
commonly denoted by this doctrinal label. My program transcends 
the narrow issue of whether particular communications technically 
should be classified as offers and acceptances, and includes questions 
often analyzed under the rubrics of implication and interpretation. At 
its broadest, my argument addresses all legal rules that answer two 
types of questions: First, which objectively verifiable actions or subjec-
tively experienced intentions suffice to conclude a bargain and form a 
contractual obligation? Second, how do these actions and intentions 
affect the substantive content of any contract formed? 
The legal doctrines governing these questions present some of the 
more subtle and technical problems in all of the law. Their metaphysi-
cal controversies and mechanical intricacies have puzzled countless 
lawyers and judges and have consigned generations of law students to 
torment at the hands of their professors. Yet the law of offer and ac-
ceptance has generated relatively little interest in the literature that 
addresses contract law from a policy perspective. Instead, commenta-
tors concerned with public policy have focused largely on the conse-
quences of contracts after formation. 
In particular, there has been little formal analysis of the rules of 
contract formation and interpretation in the law and economics litera-
ture, except in a narrow, limited sense.1 Legal scholars influenced by 
economics have generated a substantial literature on contract reme-
1. There are a few recent and laudable exceptions, most prominently Ayres & Gertner, Fill-
ing Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 
(1989). An alternative approach is provided by Coleman, Heckathorn & Maser, A Bargaining 
Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & 
Pus. POLY. 639 (1989), who examine the law of bargaining from the perspective of cooperative 
game theory. As I explain in Part Ill, I consider the noncooperative game-theoretic approach of 
the former authors more useful, since the cooperative approach, while illuminating, is not well 
grounded in the theory of individual rational choice. 
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dies,2 on excuse for mistake, impossibility, and frustration of purpose, 3 
and on private enforcement of contracts, 4 among other topics. But 
these scholars nonetheless have been primarily concerned with pre-
dicting the consequences of substantive contract terms of various 
sorts, and with identifying the optimal content of these terms. 
These writers, for the most part, have addressed formation and in-
terpretation only in arguing that the particular substantive terms that 
they have identified as optimal should as a general practice be implied, 
either in fact or in law, by courts enforcing contracts. This type of 
interpretive claim is widespread in the policy literature. A common 
version of it holds that because it is too costly for contracting parties 
explicitly to provide for every possible aspect of their bargain, courts 
can promote efficiency, fairness, or other socially desirable objectives 
by implying the optimal terms when the parties fail expressly to pro-
vide otherwise. A variation on this theme, while recognizing that opti-
mal substantive terms may vary depending on the contracting parties' 
individual circumstances, asserts that a default rule that implies terms 
optimal for typically situated parties will best promote the desired so-
cial goal. Additionally, some claim an optimally chosen default rule 
will minimize the total costs incurred by those who wish to negotiate 
around the implied term. 
While these sorts of arguments have intuitive appeal in many set-
tings, the premises necessary for their validity remain unexamined. In 
order to assess how parties will react to rules of presumptive interpre-
tation, it is necessary to consider the parties' individual incentives to 
engage in negotiation under various possible interpretative regimes. 
And those who argue in favor of default rules and presumptive terms 
have rarely investigated the parties' incentives to bargain with any-
where near the detail or rigor that they have explored the parties' 
wishes regarding the particular substantive term under consideration. 
2. The literature is too extensive to cite here in full. Prominent articles include Cooter & 
Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 1434 (1985); Craswen, Precon-
tractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1988); Polin-
sky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983); Shaven, 
The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. EcoN. 121 (1984); Shaven, Damage 
Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 466 (1980); and Ulen, The Efficiency of 
Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. R.Ev. 341 
(1984). 
3. See, e.g., Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An 
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977); White, Contract Breach and Contract Discharge 
Due to Impossibility: A Unified Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 353 (1988). 
4. See, e.g., Klein & Leffier, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 
89 J. POL. EcoN. 615 (1981); Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. 
& EcoN. 691 (1983); Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980); Wil-
liamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 519 
(1983). 
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Accordingly, the mechanical rules of contract formation so be-
loved to hombook authors and bar examiners, and the related body of 
legal doctrine that helps imply the content of the contract from the 
history of the bargaining, largely have escaped attention from those 
legal scholars influenced by economics. 5 The preponderance of the 
literature treats such rules as largely conventional, and accordingly 
irrelevant for purposes of policy analysis. Instead, the prevailing if 
implicit paradigm is well captured by the homily that it is more impor-
tant for the law to be settled than to be settled correctly. 
Under this view, which might be called the conventional wisdom 
in both a popular and a substantive sense, it is obviously necessary that 
there exist rules and that they be generally observed, but their specific 
contents are not of independent theoretical interest. Rather, the law of 
offer and acceptance serves primarily a coordinating function, in much 
the same way that traffic ordinances do. And while we need rules to 
tell motorists on which side of the road to drive, it may not matter 
whether motorists are to be instructed to keep left or to keep right, so 
long as they are all instructed similarly. 
The conventional wisdom's neglect of the law of bargaining is espe-
cially noteworthy given the critical importance of bargaining to the 
economic analysis of law. A chief message of law and economics, if 
not the chief message, is that the effect of legal rules cannot be under-
stood properly without taking account of the incentive for private 
transactions. This message is most strikingly embodied in the well-
known "Coase theorem," which in its strongest version claims that so 
long as the mechanisms of private ordering are frictionless, legal rules 
will have no effect on the allocation of resources. 6 One might have 
expected, therefore, that the set of legal rules that regulate private or-
5. One can identify, of course, exceptions to this generalization. The most prominent of 
these is the discussion of duties of disclosure in bargaining initiated by Kronman, Mistake, Dis-
closure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978). Kronman, who 
bases his analysis on the insights that private information can be socially valuable, costly to 
obtain, and deliberately acquired in view of its monetary return, argues that n rule entitling 
persons to conceal deliberately acquired information will best promote the socially efficient 
amount of informational investment. Since Kronman does not seriously attempt to combine his 
useful insights with an account of bargaining, however, his conclusion is open to question. For 
critiques of his argument, see Coleman, Heckathorn & Maser, supra note 1at692-707, and Ayres 
& Gertner, supra note 1. Another prominent exception is Baird and Weisberg's analysis of the 
"battle of the forms,'' which I discuss in Part VI. See Baird & Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and 
the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982). 
6. The Coase theorem is generally agreed to have first found expression in arguments made 
in Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 25 (1959), and Conse, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960), though Coase never stated the theorem as 
such in print and himself attributes its precise formulation to George Stigler. See R. CoASE, THE 
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 157-58 (1988). 
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dering and determine its frictions would have occupied a more promi-
nent place on the research agenda of law and economics. 
It would be surprising in light of current theoretical understand-
ings of bargaining, moreover, if contract formation and interpretation 
rules served merely a coordinating role. Most formal economic ac-
counts of bargaining conclude that when information is imperfect or 
communication costly, self-interested parties generally will fail to real-
ize the full potential surplus from exchange. Just how much is wasted 
will depend on the precise structure of the institutions that govern the 
bargaining.7 Different legal rules, once established, imply different in-
stitutional structures for contracting parties and may induce different 
forms of bargaining behavior. Hence they can have important conse-
quences for the efficiency of exchange. 
If, as the Coasian world view suggests, the consequences of all 
legal rules turn on the outcome of private barg~g, it is unclear why 
economically influenced lawyers have failed to give priority to study-
ing the law governing the bargaining process. While it is not really my 
aim here to answer this question, I can offer some speculations. One 
possibility is that the formal techniques economists use to model stra-
tegic behavior have been refined only recently and have so far been 
inaccessible to lawyers. Furthermore, because these methods are rela-
tively abstract and sometimes inconclusive, lawyers have been discour-
aged from trying to master them. 8 This answer is perhaps overly facile 
given the wholesale use such tools have found in the study of corpo-
rate control; nonetheless, a major purpose of this article is to help 
bring them to a wider audience. 
A second explanation might lie in one particular strand of the Coa-
sian tradition - the claim that impediments to bargaining are largely 
insignificant in practice. In contrast to the Coase theorem, which pur-
ports to be an analytic statement, this claim is a contingent proposition 
open to empirical challenge. Yet it retains popular influence among 
devotees of the economic approach - enough for Coase himself to 
take pains to disclaim any belief in its validity in a recent retrospective 
essay.9 The Coase theorem's aesthetic power, combined with the rela-
7': See, e.g., Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem. 1 J. EcoN. PERSP. 113 (1987); 
Myerson & Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading. 29 J. EcoN. THEORY 265 
(1983). 
8. This may be rapidly changing, in light of the growing importance of game-theoretic meth-
odology to applied microeconomics generally. The recent 1990 meeting of the AALS Section on 
Law and Economics, for instance, was devoted to a discussion of applications of game theory. 
See also Ayres, Playing Games with the Law (Book Review), 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291 (1990). 
9. See R. CoASE, supra note 6, at 174: 
The world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a Coasian world. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. It is the world of modern economic theory, one which I 
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tively sanguine view of private ordering that infuses much law-and-
economics scholarship, may have directed attention away from part of 
Coase's message, and away from the details of private negotiation. 
But the broadest reason for law-and-economics scholars' neglect of 
the rules of offer and acceptance may be that more traditional legal 
commentators have ignored the subject as well, instead relying on the 
conventional wisdom. Charles Fried's description is a fair representa-
tive in this regard: 
Promises - and therefore contracts - are fundamentally relational; one 
person must make the promise to another, and the second person must 
accept it. Acceptance may be assured by any conventional device, such 
as speaking the words "I accept" with the intention of referring to a 
conventional device in which the words figure. There are wide latitude 
and informality in what counts as an intention to accept a promise, just 
as the promise itself can be made in many ways.10 
Now the conventional wisdom is not without its appeal, much of 
which stems from the fact that it happens to describe reasonably well, 
at least at the hombook level, current American legal doctrine in the 
area. Because of the great diversity of settings in which individuals 
may negotiate, black-letter statements in the area are typically phrased 
in general language and anticipate a wide variety of possible social 
practices. The Second Restatement's definitions of offer and accept-
ance are illustrative: 
§ 24. Offer Defined. An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter 
into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding 
that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it. 
§ 50. Acceptance of Offer Defined .... (1) Acceptance of an offer is a 
manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a 
manner invited or required by the offer. 11 
Beyond the necessarily general language of black-letter formula-
tions, American contract law also allows contracting parties consider-
able leeway to choose the form of their agreement in practice. This is 
especially so for contracts governed by Article II of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, which in large part reflects the view of Llewellyn and 
his colleagues that commercial law should be grounded in the expecta-
tions of the community of traders. 12 Aside from its variety of specific 
was hoping to persuade economists to leave. What I did in ''The Problem of Social Cost" 
was simply to bring to light some of its properties. 
10. C. FRIED, CoNTRACT AS PROMISE 4546 (1981). 
11. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS §§ 24, 50 (1979). 
12. This is a view, of course, with historical antecedents going back at least as far as Mans· 
field. See generally Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
27 STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975); Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant 
Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987). 
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provisions referring to trade usage, course of dealing, course of per-
formance, good faith, and commercial reasonableness, Article II di-
rects courts generally to defer to private usage in adjudicating 
formation issues.13 
At a more theoretical level, furthermore, scholarly discussion of 
contract formation, motivated by the proverbial image of the "meeting 
of the minds," has typically focused on the tension between objective 
and subjective theories of mutual assent. This tension has underscored 
the questions of how communication between two individuals takes 
place and how the substance of that communication can be known to a 
third party called upon to enforce the contract. Such questions lead 
naturally to the philosophy of language; and so modem accounts of 
offer and acceptance have tended to reflect the philosophical litera-
ture's emphasis on conventional understandings as an explanation of 
meaning.14 This emphasis has been sustained in more recent years by 
theoretical accounts of contract law such as Fried's15 that, in concen-
trating on the basic question of why promises should be enforced, tend 
to take as given the meaning of promissory language.16 
Other, broader currents in the history of contract law have helped 
reinforce the conventional wisdom. At the height of its formal elabo-
ration in the nineteenth century, as exemplified by cases like Adams v. 
Lindself 11 and Dickinson v. Dodds, is the central concerns of the law of 
offer and acceptance were whether and at what point a contract had 
been formed. With the decline of laissez-faire ideology and of tradi-
tional formalism, and with the growing acceptance of promissory es-
toppel as a foundation for liability, these issues receded in 
13. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-204 (1989): 
Formation in general. (1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient 
to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of 
such a contract. (2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found 
even though the moment ofits making is undetermined. (3) Even though one or more terms 
are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to 
make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy. 
See also U.C.C. § 2-206 (1989) ("Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contracts. (1) Unless 
otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances (a) an offer to make a 
contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable 
in the circumstances •... "). 
14. See generally Farnsworth, ''Meaning" in the Law of Contracts. 16 YALE L.J. 939 (1967); 
Williams, Language and the Law (pt. 4), 61 L.Q. REV. 384 (1945). 
15. See C. FRIED, supra note 10. 
16. For an insightful critique on these grounds of promissory theories in general, see Cras-
well, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 Mice. L. REV. 489 
(1989). 
17. 1 B. & Ald. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818). 
18. 2 Ch. D. 463 (C.A. 1876). 
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'°'' ,, 
importance.19 Instead, the content of contractual obligation came to 
loom larger than its existence. This shift in emphasis was reinforced 
by the increase in duration and complexity of commercial relation-
ships associated with the development of the modem economy.20 
Whatever the origins of modem scholarly inattention to the rules 
of offer and acceptance, however, it has meant the neglect of an impor-
tant set of policy considerations. Economic policy issues do arise 
under the conventional view; yet discourse is limited to a subset of 
concerns that arise only in the course of administering the prevailing 
understandings - what might be called convention maintenance. 
These concerns include protecting the reliance interests of those who 
operate according to established convention, mediating between those 
using rival conventions, and providing incentives for newcomers to 
learn established convention.21 
While the maintenance of a given convention is obviously impor-
tant for the particular parties who use it, none of the policy considera-
tions thereby raised gives us any assistance in deciding what the ideal 
convention should or could be in the long run.22 In principle, one 
cannot define a convention solely on the basis of reliance or expecta-
tions, simply because the reasonableness of reliance or expectation is 
ordinarily judged in light of prevailing background understandings.23 
19. See generally G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OP CoNTRAcr (1974); cf. Comment, Once More 
into the Breach: Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Damage Doctrine, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 559, 
574 (1970): 
Most important [for· private autonomy] iS the fact that the point at which the bargain is 
struck is usually mutually identifiable to the parties. They themselves are aware of the ex· 
tent to which they may act in their own interests, and of the point at which their conduct 
bas led to a binding obligation. The requirement of consideration thus operates to delineate 
an identifiable sphere of precontractual conduct free of legal restraint. 
20. See generally Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts. 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974). 
21. Such considerations are raised by cases like Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 
1948), and Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965), where individu· 
als seeking franchise or dealership contracts sunk substantial reliance investments in the course 
of preliminary negotiations, and by Frigaliment Importing v. B.N.S. Intl. Sales, 190 F. Supp. 116 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), in which one of Judge Henry Friendly's classic commercial opinions grew out 
of a valiant attempt to mediate between two poultry dealers disputing the meaning of the word 
"chicken." One reason the preliminary negotiation cases are widely cited and studied is that they 
illustrate the tension between the commercial conventions used by ordinary business persons and 
the formal legalistic conventions expressed in traditional black-letter law, as well as the tension 
between the individualistic convention of hard bargaining practiced by the franchisors and the 
more altruistic, relational conventions supposedly favored by small business JY..TSOns. The Fri· 
galiment case, where either one side relied on trade ~ge and the other on general usage, or 
where each relied on different trade usages, presents an analogous problem. 
22. Except, of course, that a convention with lower maintenance costs, perhaps due to its 
simplicity, would thereby have an advantage over one with higher maintenance costs, other 
things being equal. 
23. Theories that ground legal doctrine in the historical tradition or custom of a particular 
society may escape circularity, but exclude the possibility that tradition can be improved on. 
Moreover, the dictates of tradition may not always be clear-cut. 
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Any particular convention that happened to be accepted widely would 
involve efficiency and distributional concerns of some sort in its 
maintenance. 
The long-run costs and benefits of a convention, however, also de-
pend on how it affects individuals' behavior once established and ac-
cepted. To return to the traffic law analogy, having everyone keep to 
the left side of the road might conceivably be a better policy than hav-
ing everyone keep to the right. Differences in reaction times arising 
from the fact that the majority of drivers are right-handed, for in-
stance, or asymmetric features of local roads, might make one of the 
two conventions superior ex ante. Where no convention yet exists, as 
when a newly discovered technology or legal innovation allows a new 
class of transactions, such considerations can usefully guide the devel-
opment of legal doctrine. 
Furthermore, even when conventions are well entrenched, the 
long-run advantages of a superior convention might outweigh the 
transitional disadvantages of switching conventions. With careful 
planning these disadvantages can be minimized, and they are tempo-
rary. The costs of an inefficient or unfair convention, in contrast, are 
made up in volume; they are paid each time a transaction occurs under 
its auspices. 
To recapitulate, for new categories of transactions, newly devel-
oped institutions, private associations, and well-run organizations able 
to alter their standard procedures without unreasonable disruption, a 
policy analysis of rival bargaining conventions may be of great practi-
cal importance. Even if it is not open to us to change existing conven-
tions, moreover, studying their long-run consequences can help us 
understand how they affect efficiency, private autonomy, and other so-
cial objectives. Such an understanding may also help to evaluate other 
arguments that presuppose some form of private ordering as a back-
ground condition; most notably the Coase theorem. 
In this article, I hope to pe~uade the reader of two propositions: 
first, that the rules of contract formation and interpretation are funda-
mental to understanding the outcome and efficiency of bargaining 
transactions; and second, that bargaining rules and institutions are 
best understood by a detailed inquiry into their strategic structure. By 
this I mean that one must carefully specify the possible choices avail-
able to parties engaged in negotiation, the temporal sequence in which 
the choices occur, the costs and benefits to each party for each possible 
sequence of actions, and the information available at each step. Only 
then is it possible to predict how rational or imperfectly rational indi-
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viduals will behave under a given bargaining regime.24 I contend that 
the strategic structure of offer and acceptance determines the long-run 
characteristics of private ordering. 
Before illustrating these claims with regard to specific legal rules, 
however, some general background is necessary. Accordingly, Part II 
of this paper outlines the central role of the bargaining problem in the 
law and economics literature. Part III provides a necessarily incom-
plete survey of the economics of bargaining, and its main concepts and 
techniques. Part IV discusses a number of qualifications to the analy-
sis, and sets forth the main limitations of the game-theoretic approach 
and the problems raised in applying it to contract bargaining. 
The succeeding two Parts are the heart of the article: they apply 
the method to two particular doctrinal areas. Part V uses a simple 
model of bargaining to analyze the doctrine of acceptance by silence, 
and Part VI presents a model of contract negotiation in the form-con-
tract setting and analyzes the common law duty to read. Finally, Part 
VII comments on the implications of the specific models for future 
analysis. 
One caveat is appropriate, however. I do not mean to suggest that 
legal rules are the only important determinants of the outcome of bar-
gaining. In many settings, social norms and ethical precepts provide 
well-defined and successful ways to divide the surplus from exchange 
and to reduce the social costs of strategic behavior.25 Particular meth-
ods of dividing the gains from trade, such as a fifty-fifty split or choos-
ing a round number, may be aesthetically appealing or may offer focal 
points to which the parties are drawn. Furthermore, the desire to 
maintain goodwill or an ongoing relationship will encourage coopera-
tion, since an individual acquiring a reputation for contentiousness 
may find it difficult to attract future contract partners. All these fac-
tors would be important elements in a complete account of negotia-
tion. Nevertheless, when social sanctions are insufficient to achieve 
full cooperation, as they often are in reality, the legal rules of bargain-
ing play an important role. Indeed, legal rules that discourage cooper-
ation make it more difficult for nonlegal institutions to perform their 
facilitative roles in exchange.26 Accordingly, I focus here only on the 
24. While I am by .no means committed to rational-choice models as the only plausible de-
scription of human behavior, I do view the assumption of rationality as the most useful starting 
point for a research strategy for studying strategic interaction. On this question, see infra Part 
IV. 
25. See, e.g., Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta 
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986); Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Pre-
liminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963). 
26. For one thing, settlements reached by private actors will typically be influenced by their 
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role of legal rules and institutions. 
II. THE BARGAINING PROBLEM IN LAW AND EcONOMICS 
While a few hard-core loyalists may maintain that the premises of 
the Coase theorem generally are satisfied in actual practice, most 
scholars regard the claim that private ordering is frictionless as trivial-
izing the problem of cooperation. Instead, Coase's real influence was 
in focusing attention on impediments to exchange which arise in par-
ticular institutional settings. Such impediments are typically grouped 
under the general rubric of "transaction costs" - a term embracing a 
variety of technological and informational factors that differ widely in 
origin and explanation. In the broader Coasian view, the regulatory 
consequences of law can be understood only by focusing on transac-
tion costs and on the institutional structure generating them.27 
The generality of the transaction cost concept and the looseness 
with which the term has been used in the law-and-economics litera-
ture, however, have obscured Coase's lesson. Consequently, some 
have disparaged his theorem as a tautology,28 as indeed it would be if 
transaction costs were defined as anything preventing a mutually bene-
fi.cial bargain. The considerations commonly included under the 
transaction-cost label can more usefully be divided into two groups: 
costs of implementation and costs of strategic behavior. 29 Implementa-
tion costs are the real resources used up in bringing contracting parties 
together, in executing and administering the resulting agreement, in 
enforcing any bargain reached, and in settling any disputes that arise 
along the way. These costs include the expense of communication 
among the parties, of acquiring information about the value of the rel-
evant costs and benefits, of drafting and executing any writing, of 
transporting any physical objects at issue, of making and collecting 
payments, of detecting any violations of the bargain, and of con-
ducting any necessary renegotiations. 
Since implementation costs are measured in resources, they are di-
views of how legal authorities would resolve the situation should other institutions fail in the 
task. See, e.g., H. Ross, SETILED OUT OF CoURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE 
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS (1970); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
27. See, e.g., Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972) 
(discussing tort and property); Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of 
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 233-61 (1979) (discussing contract). 
28. See, e.g., Calabresi, Transaction Costs. Resource Allocation and Liability Rules -A Com-
ment, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 67, 68 (1968). 
29. The distinction is due to Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982), though 
he does not use these particular terms. This Part of the article owes a great deal to Cooter's 
analysis. 
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rectly comparable to the potential surplus from an agreement, and if 
they exceed that surplus no exchange can profitably occur. To illus-
trate, a Chevrolet dealer in Chicago may be willing to sell me a car for 
less than the maximum I am willing to pay, which is itself bounded by 
the price of similar cars in Ann Arbor where I live. If the difference 
between my price and the dealer's is not very large, however, it will 
not be worth my while to learn the dealer's price, get myself to Chi-
cago via some other means of transportation, and drive the car back. 
Still, I can better justify this trouble for the savings on a car than for 
the savings on a minor purchase like a box of breakfast cereal. 
Strategic behavior costs, in contrast, are the losses suffered because 
bargainers have the incentive to maximize their individual gains rather 
than the total surplus from exchange. Since the potential surplus can 
be divided among the parties in various ways, the parties may invest 
real resources in hopes of altering the division. Or, they may act in 
ways that either destroy a portion of the surplus or that risk that the 
bargain will fall through. Such actions may include selling or buying a 
lesser quantity than one really wants in order to get a better price (like 
the canonical monopolist), misrepresenting or withholding informa-
tion about cost or value, making bluffs (and perhaps carrying them out 
for the sake of credibility), or extended haggling, which both takes up 
valuable time and delays the enjoyment of the bargain. For example, 
even once I reach the point of negotiating with the Chevrolet dealer, I 
may understate the price I am willing to pay, and the dealer may over-
state the price at which she is willing to sell. This behavior is wasteful 
because it takes actual time and because the dealer and I, by conceal-
ing information, may fail to discover that a mutually beneficial bargain 
exists. 
The two types of transaction costs I have identified can be distin-
guished on a number of functional grounds. For one, the normative 
terms in which each is evaluated are markedly different. The loss of 
an exchange due to implementation costs is not ordinarily described as 
inefficient, unless those costs are wastefully high. For instance, if the 
cost of shipping my Chevrolet from Chicago exceeds the difference 
between my price and the dealer's, then the exchange is not worth 
performing. While both the dealer and I might wish that shipping 
costs were lower, we would not regret the lost deal ex post. In con-
trast, if we miss an exchange by concealing information, we subse-
quently may wish we had acted differently, and many would view the 
outcome as inefficient. Jo 
30. More accurately, the appropriate definition of efficiency may be controversial when not 
all information is shared, as is observed by Holmstrom & Myerson, Efficient and Durable Deci-
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More important from a methodological standpoint, however, im-
plementation costs are substantially more straightforwardly and well 
defined; they are the concrete costs of undertaking specific activities 
and are in principle directly measurable. In contrast, while strategic 
behavior costs can result in resource expenditure, they may in some 
circumstances be measurable only by lost potential surplus - that is, 
by the absence of a bargain. Criticisms of the Coase theorem as tauto-
logical, accordingly, are better directed at strategic behavior than im-
plementation costs. Any practical account of strategic costs will 
require some theory of bargaining - one that predicts under what 
circumstances bargainers will be able to reach a cooperative out-
come. 31 Much of the law-and-economics literature, accordingly, has 
concerned itself implicitly with how legal rules set the framework for 
bargaining. 
A. The Relation Between Substantive Legal Rules and Bargaining 
Many prominent contributions to the economic analysis of law 
suggest how substantive entitlements affect strategic behavior. Cala-
bresi and Melamed's distinction between liability and property rules 
provides the classic illustration. 32 They observed that a particular 
legal entitlement such as the right to undisturbed enjoyment of a given 
parcel of land can be protected in at least two ways. If the entitlement 
is protected only by a liability rule, anyone has the legal power, if not 
the right, to violate it provided they pay damages in compensation. In 
contrast, when an entitlement is protected by a property rule, no one 
has the power to violate it without first obtaining the permission of the 
holder. Such a rule might be enforced by criminal or equitable sanc-
tions, effectively requiring that permission to make use of the entitle-
ment be obtained in a voluntary exchange. 
As Calabresi and Melamed argued, the choice among these alter-
natives (and a third- making the entitlement inalienable) both influ-
ences and depends on private bargaining. The different rules alter the 
threats and offers available to the parties. Under a liability rule, the 
potential infringer has the power to cut short the bargaining and force 
sion Rules with Incomplete Information, 51 EcoNOMETRICA 1799 (1983). That the dealer and I 
regret the outcome of our haggling is not the same as saying we view our original actions as 
incorrect given our positions at the time we took them. The decision to be a tough bargainer may 
be sensible when one does not know the opponent's reservation price, but the failure of the 
negotiation conveys new information initially not available. 
31. Regan's well-known critique of the Coase theorem literature makes just this point. Re-
gan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 427 (1972); see also Cooter, supra 
note 29. 
32. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972). 
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the question of the valuation of the entitlement before some public 
authority. Under a property rule, the entitlement holder has the 
power to end the bargaining without an exchange taking place. These 
possibilities may alter the outcome of any negotiation that occurs. 
Other determinants of bargaining can influence the relative efficiency 
or fairness of the alternative rules. For instance, if the institutional 
authority charged with enforcing an entitlement has relatively poor 
information about the social costs and benefits of an infringement, a 
liability rule may be relatively inefficient. In such a situation it might 
be better to decentralize the allocative decision via a property rule, 
which allows the parties to establish the value of the entitlement by 
private agreement. 33 
Parallel arguments can be found in the economic analyses of virtu-
ally every field of the law. Much of the debate over the economics of 
contract remedies, for instance, turns on the commentators' differing 
views of e?C post renegotiation. Whether specific performance is more 
effective than money damages in promoting the efficient level of con-
tract breach can depend upon the strategic behavior costs it induces.34 
One's view of the merits of the standard alternatives to measuring 
money damages - expectation, reliance, and restitution - will simi-
larly be affected by one's view of bargaining. Since the efficiency of the 
various measures depends on the relative importance of encouraging 
efficient breach, reliance, or risk allocation,35 by affecting the relative 
significance of these factors ex post renegotiation can alter the ranking 
of the various measures. 36 
Within law and economics more generally, one's account of strate-
gic behavior costs will typically determine one's basic normative 
stance. If one posits that the parties usually will find it in their interest 
to cooperate, one is led to what Cooter and Ulen have called the "nor-
mative Coase theorem": that the law should be structured to mini-
33. See id. 
34. Compare, e.g., Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979) 
(arguing that specific performance, by eliminating large liquidated damages payouts, would mini-
mize gains of strategic behavior) with Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 
(1978) (specific performance will raise cost of accepting potentially efficient alternative offers). 
Ulen, supra note 2, attempts to reconcile the two arguments. A recent technical game-theoretic 
analysis of the issue can be found in Lewis, Perry & Sappington, Renegotiation and Specific 
Performance, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS., Winter 1989, at 33. 
35. See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 2; Shavell, supra note 2; Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and 
Damage Measures far Breach of Contract, 15 RAND J. EcoN. 39 (1984). 
36. See Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 629 (1988), and Craswell, supra note 2 (arguing on this logic that the importance 
of efficient breach has been overrated and damage rules should be designed to promote efficiency 
in risk allocation and in deciding whether to enter into contracts ex ante). 
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mize the impediments to private bargaining. 37 Given the hypothesis of 
cooperation, these impediments will be, in my terminology, primarily 
implementation costs; this suggests a relatively libertarian path for the 
law. In this view, infringements on the freedom of contract for some 
should be tolerated only to lessen transaction costs for a larger number 
of others. 38 
On the other hand, if noncooperation is the rule, the social harm 
that would arise from the prescriptions of the normative Coase theo- . 
rem could be great. Cooter, in an incisive critique of the Coasian liter-
ature, reminds readers of the very different account of self-interested 
behavior provided by Hobbes' Leviathan, and wryly suggests a "Hob-
bes theorem" as counterweight to the Coase theorem: since untram-
meled selfishness will inevitably lead to a war of all against all in which 
life will be nasty, brutish, and short, legal rules should be designed to 
minimize the cost incurred when cooperation fails. 39 
To determine whether a Coasian or Hobbesian approach is the bet-
ter practical guide, we need to specify more carefully the bargaining 
likely to take place. For example, even from a Hobbesian viewpoint, 
one need not advocate minimizing the cost of a bargaining breakdown 
in the individual case, since the cost of a breakdown might influence 
its likelihood. If the parties knew that the consequences of failing to 
agree were very severe, they might act in a more cooperative fashion 
than otherwise. 40 The net effect on the expected costs of strategic be-
havior would then depend upon whether the probability of agreement 
increased more or less than proportionately to the loss from a break-
down.41 The result cannot be predicted without either a specific theo-
37. See generally Cooter, supra note 29; R. CooTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND EcoNOMICS 99-
102 (1988). I suspect this is the primary difference, rather than partisan ideology or geographical 
origins, separating the so-called "conservative" and "liberal" wings of law-and-economics 
scholarship. 
38. An application of this principle would be implying a particular term in a contract in 
order to save the majority of contracting parties the expense of writing it in explicitly. The 
presumption should be rebuttable, though; if particular individuals do not want the implied term 
and are prepared to pay the implementation costs of eliminating it, it is efficient to allow them to 
do so. 
39. Cooter, supra note 29, at 18. 
40. But see Crawford, A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining, 50 EcoNOMETRICA 607 
(1982); Fudenberg & Tirole, Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information, 50 REV. EcoN. 
STUD. 221 (1983) (formal models in which an increase in the potential surplus· from an agree-
ment can lower the probability of a successful bargain). 
41. Expected losses, of course, need not be the social minimand. If we as a society were more 
concerned about a small risk of a relatively large loss than about a large risk of a relatively small 
loss, we might want to follow Cooter's "Hobbes Theorem" and design legal rules that minimize 
the chances of the former. An illustration of the tradeoff is found in debates over nuclear strat-
egy: advocates of a strong nuclear deterrent stress that the threat of mutual assured destruction 
reduces to nil the chances of a superpower conflict, while opponents highlight the risks should 
something go wrong. 
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retical account of, or reliable empirical evidence about, the bargaining 
process. 
B. The Effect of Contract Formation Rules on Bargaining 
This intellectual background makes it all the more surprising that 
the law of contract formation has attracted only scant attention in the 
law-and-economics literature. If the basic arguments of law and eco-
nomics turn on the theory of bargaining, as I have argued, and if these 
conclusions are in fundamental dispute, we should look to the law of 
bargaining to help resolve the controversy. In this light, contract for-
mation should be seen as logically prior to most if not all of the major 
issues in law and economics. 
Both kinds of transaction costs are affected in large part by rules of 
contract formation and interpretation. For example, various rules pre-
scribe the degree of thoroughness and formality required for a con-
tract to be enforceable. Among these are the Statute of Frauds, the 
definiteness doctrine (which demands that the parties specify the ma-
jor terms of the agreement in requisite detail)42 and, in important re-
spects, the doctrine of consideration. 43 
Such requirements directly affect the implementation costs of 
agreement. To satisfy the Statute of Frauds, time and effort must be 
expended to create an authoritative record of the agreement; papers 
and perhaps the parties themselves must be transported back and forth 
at substantial expense and delay. To satisfy the definiteness doctrine, 
resources must be spent negotiating specific contract language at a 
time where relevant information is still unknown.44 
Perhaps less obviously, rules of offer and acceptance also influence 
strategic behavior costs. Requiring additional negotiation before a 
contract becomes enforceable, for instance, changes the information 
available to the parties at various critical moments. Parties may ac-
quire information about the other side's likely future behavior at the 
42. The requirement of definiteness has relaxed in recent years, in part due to the influence of 
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-204(3), which provides that "a contract for sale does not fail for 
indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain 
basis for giving an appropriate remedy." U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1989). The U.C.C. also provides 
various presumptive or "off-the-shelf" terms that will be implied to supplement an incomplete 
agreement, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-308 (1989) (place of delivery), § 2-309 (1989) (time of delivery), and 
§ 2-310 (1989) (time and place of payment). 
43. See generally Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). 
44. The requirements could be cost-justified, of course, if they help reduce costs of later 
administering and enforcing the contract. But see Huberman & Kahn, Limited Contract En-
forcement and Strategic Renegotiation, 18 AM. EcoN. REV. 471 (1988) (where the enforcing 
authority has imperfect information ex post, an efficient contract may be achievable only by 
planning for and engaging in renegotiation). 
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time reliance investments must be sunk. This infom!iation will intro-
duce certain possibilities of influencing the adversary's actions and will 
foreclose some others. For another example, rules requiring disclosure 
of private information or penalizing nondisclosure may, by reducing 
the cost of investigation and lowering the chance of error, improve the 
efficiency of negotiation.4s 
Many interesting theoretical questions in this area of the law cry 
out for a more detailed analysis in this regard. The distinction be-
tween bilateral and unilateral contracts, for example, has perplexed 
generations of lawyers. When can a binding acceptance be accom-
plished by simply performing the actions requested by the promisor as 
consideration, and when is it necessary for the promisee to provide a 
counter-promise in order to accept?46 While the outcomes of actual 
disputes turn on the distinction, the possible reasons why a promisor 
would want to choose one over the other and the different bargaining 
frameworks thereby implied are less than clear; and the efficiency con-
sequences of a presumption in one direction or another remain an 
open question. 
The network of rules that govern the mechanics of contracts con-
cluded by correspondence provides a second set of examples. Suppose 
two individuals send each other identical offers that cross in the mail 
and are received simultaneously. According to black-letter law no 
contract is formed until one of the parties posts a responding accept-
ance. 47 Mechanical rules such as these commonly are justified on the 
ground that they establish a benchmark around which parties can plan 
their affairs; any more complexity would supposedly create confusion 
during the bargaining. This justification would be more persuasive if 
parties knew at the time of bargaining whether their communications 
would ultimately be classified as offers, acceptances, or as some other 
preliminary communication such as an invitation to make an offer. In 
45. See generally the sources cited in supra note 1. But see Matthews & Postlewaite, Quality 
Testing and Disclosure. 16 RAND J. EcoN. 328 (1985) (arguing that product information will 
decrease under a regime of mandatory disclosure). 
46. See R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 32 (1979) ("Invitation of Promise or 
Performance"), § 45 (1979) ("Option Contract Created by Part Performance or Tender''), and 
§ 62 (1979) ("Effect of Performance by Offeree Where Offer Invites Either Performance or Prom-
ise"); E. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcrs § 3.12 (1982). 
47. See R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 23, illustration 4 (1979). There is a 
proliferation of complementary doctrines addressing variations on this problem. Suppose an at-
tempt to revoke and an attempt to accept cross in the mail; the black-letter rule is that the 
acceptance prevails, unless the original offer specified otherwise. Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & Aid. 
681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818); see also R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 63 
(1979). Alternatively, suppose an offeree regrets an acceptance and wires a rejection that over-
takes the accepting communication? According to black-letter law the acceptance is binding on 
the offeree, but if the offeror relies on an apparent rejection, the offeree is estopped from enforc-
ing the contract. See id., comment c and illustration 7. 
232 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:215 
reality, however, actual communications generally are not labeled "of-
fer" or "acceptance," and, even if they were, the label would not be 
legally conclusive. On the other hand, which particular mechanical 
rule is chosen will set the structure and sequence of bargaining, and 
change the time at which parties can safely rely. The choice is by no 
means neutral.48 
These examples illustrate the relevance of developing a practical 
theory of contract bargaining, both to evaluate the rules of contract 
formation in terms of their effect on the efficiency and fairness of ex-
change, and to evaluate other legal rules thaf set the substantive 
framework for negotiation. In the remainder of this article, I explain 
how I think this can and should be done. 
Ill. A SKETCHY SURVEY OF THE EcONOMICS OF BARGAINING 
In this Part and the next I outline the basic features of the theoreti-
cal approach currently used by most economists to analyze bargaining. 
The survey is necessarily incomplete; however, a basic familiarity with 
the approach is a prerequisite for the specific discussions of Parts V 
and VI. Readers conversant with the modem theory of incomplete 
information games may skip directly to Part V without loss of 
continuity.49 
Take as an illustration an archetypical bargaining problem: that of 
dividing a cake of fixed size and uniform quality between two parties. 
Each would prefer more cake to less, but the cake will go to waste 
unless they can agree on its division. One useful account of this prob-
lem has been described in the law-and-economics literature by Cooter, 
48. A third example is furnished by the various doctrines governing renegotiation, as the 
opportunity to modify a contract can substantially complicate both the bargaining framework 
and the strategies the parties can adopt. This problem has recently attracted a fair amount of 
attention from economists studying the theory of bargaining. See, e.g., Crawford, Long-Term 
Relationships Governed by Short-Term Contracts, 78 AM. EcoN. REV. 485 (1988); Farrell & 
Shapiro, Optimal Contracts with Lock-in, 19 AM. EcoN. REV. 51 (1989); Huberman & Kahn, 
supra note 44; Tirole, Procurement and Renegotiation, 94 J. POL. EcoN. 235 (1986). Rules that 
apply the consideration doctrine to limit the range of substantive exchanges possible at the modi-
fication stage, such as the common law preexisting duty rule and the rule of Foakes v. Beer, 9 
App. Cas. 605 (H.L. 1884), alter bargaining by making it possible credibly to commit not to 
agree to certain modifications. For a game-theoretic analysis of the preexisting duty rule, see 
Graham & Peirce, Contract Modification: An Economic Analysis of the Hold-Up Game, LAW & 
CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1989, at 9. 
49. For those wishing more complete surveys of the game-theoretic approach to bargaining, 
leading treatises include J. FRIEDMAN, GAME THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS TO EcoNOMICS 
(1986); E. RAsMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION (1989); M. SHUBIK, A GAME-THEORETIC 
APPROACH TO PoLmCAL EcONOMY (1984); and M. SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES (1982). Shorter but excellent introductions to the field can be found in J. ELSTER, THE 
CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 50-96 (1989); and Aumann, Game Theory, 
in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS 460-82 (1987), to which my sum-
mary is greatly indebted. 
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Marks, and Mnookin. 50 Suppose the parties are instructed simultane-
ously to submit a single, sealed demand. The demands are satisfied if 
it is possible to do so, and any unclaimed leftover cake is split evenly; 
otherwise the parties get nothing. The parties understand the rules of 
play and know their opponents do as well.· In addition, each party has 
some personal characteristics, such as attitudes toward risk or the rate 
at which marginal utility from cake diminishes, that her opponent 
cannot specifically observe and that affect her optimal bargaining 
strategy. As a result, neither party can predict her opponent's demand 
with certainty, but both may be able to do so probabilistically. While 
this account is highly stylized, its underlying framework can be ex-
tended to more complicated environments involving multiple offers, 
bargaining over a variable surplus, and the like. 
Consider the likely result of this process. Each party, when select-
ing a demand, chooses between relatively tough and relatively soft de-
mands, knowing her opponent faces the same opportunity. A tough 
demand is more likely to be incompatible with the opponent's de-
mand, and so risks a higher probability of winding up with no cake at 
all. A soft demand lessens the chance of disagreement, but risks un-
necessarily yielding cake if the opponent has also made a soft demand. 
Each party will likely balance on the margin the probability of reach-
ing a settlement against the value of getting a better settlement. Un-
less the parties are infinitely risk-averse, in general each will wish to 
live with at least some chance of disagreement. This implies that the 
outcome of bargaining cannot be fully Pareto efficient ex post.51 
The Cooter-Marks-Mnookin model, of course, is not the only pos-
sible analysis of the cake-division problem or indeed of bargaining gen-
erally. Its key premises include the assumption of single and sealed 
offers, and the assumption that the parties lack the information needed 
to deduce their opponents' optimal demands with certainty; minor as-
sumptions such as the splitting of unclaimed cake between the parties 
also affect the details if not the basic features of the outcome. There 
are various alternative accounts of bargaining available, each of which, 
like this one, manages to capture some aspects of actual bargaining. 
None of the available accounts is entirely satisfactory; and in honesty 
one must admit that economists do not yet understand bargaining all 
that well. By this I mean simply that the discipline of economics as 
50. Cooter, Marks & Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of 
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982). 
51. For a formal mathematical analysis of this model, see Chatterjee & Samuelson, Bargain-
ing Under Incomplete Information, 31 OPERATIONS R.Es. 835 (1983). Myerson & Satterthwaite, 
supra note 7, show that the sealed-bid procedure is as efficient as any that can be designed given 
the informational constraints of the problem. 
234 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:215 
yet possesses no canonical theory of bargaining that can be taken off 
the shelf and applied to a variety of specific problems, in the way that 
the model of perfect competition is widely applied to market behavior. 
Although bargaining is fundamental to many important economic 
phenomena entirely outside law and economics - such as bilateral 
monopoly, labor-management relations, and the theory of the firm -
economists working on each of these problems will typically devise a 
specific model of strategic behavior for the particular purpose at hand. 
Despite the absence of a consensus theory of bargaining, econo-
mists generally do agree on the ways in which research about bargain-
ing should proceed. Most existing work on the topic falls into one of 
two basic paradigms: the cooperative (or axiomatic) approach and the 
noncooperative approach. The cooperative paradigm has received at-
tention primarily from mathematical economists and focuses on bar-
gainers as a group more than as individuals. 52 The noncooperative 
paradigm, conversely, of which the Cooter-Marks-Mnookin model is 
an example, is distinguished by its attempt to describe individually ra-
tional behavior in situations of mutual recognized dependence; that is, 
when the players understand that their actions both affect and are af-
fected by the actions of others. Because the noncooperative paradigm, 
like neoclassical economics as a whole, is clearly grounded in the pos-
tulate of individual utility maximization, it has been substantially 
more influential than has the cooperative approach among applied 
economists. 53 Furthermore, since the noncooperative approach usu-
ally is less abstract and is more closely tied to the particular strategic 
environment at hand, it is better suited to the investigation of actual 
institutions affecting bargaining. For these reasons, it is the approach 
52. The resulting axiomatic analyses typically have two objectives: First, they attempt to 
derive a solution to the bargaining problem by defining a set of normatively appealing features -
the axioms - that any solution should have. Typical axioms include efficiency and the invari-
ance of the outcome to rescaling of quantitative measures. Second, they attempt logically to 
deduce which of the possible outcomes satisfy these axioms. Kenneth Arrow's well-known "int· 
possibility theorem," which has recently gained attention from legal scholars, represents this 
paradigm if we interpret it as addressing the overall bargain inlplicit in the social contract. In 
this context, Arrow's theorem states that none of the possible outcomes of the bargaining can 
satisfy what he saw as a mininlally acceptable set of axioms. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE 
AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963). A general but technical introduction to the axiomatic ap-
proach is found in Harsanyi, Bargaining. in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVB: A DICTIONARY OP Eco-
NOMICS, supra note 49, at 190-95. One frequently cited survey of research in the area is A. 
ROTH, AxlOMATIC MODELS OF BARGAINING (1985). 
53. As applied economists have increasingly turned to game theory in recent years to help 
analyze a wide selection of economic issues, pure game theorists have begun to devote greater 
efforts to the unification of the two paradigms. For a leading example of this research program, 
which seeks to build noncooperative models that yield particular axiomatic solutions as their 
equilibria, see Binmore, Rubinstein & Wolinsky, The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic 
Modeling. 17 RAND J. EcoN. 176 (1986). 
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I follow in this article. 54 
Several points require clarification. It is customary when con-
structing game-theoretic models to make a variety of standard as-
sumptions that result in a fairly ·stylized analysis. Rationality, in 
particular, is generally taken to mean that the participants (or "play-
ers") know the nature of the environment in which they operate. This 
need not imply they have information about every relevant aspect of 
the situation, but it does mean that they are aware (!f the extent to 
which they are ignorant. Furthermore, it is generally assumed that 
the players' computational abilities are unlimited; they can reason 
through an arbitrary number of logical steps if necessary. In such a 
context, individual maximization requires each party to select an opti-
mal strategy - a complete plan of actions to be taken under all rele-
vant contingencies. 
A player's optimal strategy will depend on the strategies chosen by 
other players; in this sense all players' strategies are interdependent. 
There generally exist some configurations of strategies, however, such 
that each individual party's strategy is an optimal response to the set 
of strategies chosen by all the others. Such a set of choices is com-
monly felt to be a plausible outcome of the game, since no individual 
player has the incentive unilaterally to change her behavior so long as 
she assumes that all other players reason similarly. This situation is 
referred to as a Nash equilibrium, after the mathematical economist 
John Nash, who argued that unprofitability of individual deviations 
should be a necessary condition for an outcome of a game to be con-
sidered stable. 55 
The focus on Nash equilibria has been a standard feature of game-
theoretic analyses for almost forty years and has found a number of 
54. Much of the recent economic literature on litigation settlement relies on the non-
cooperative paradigm. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Informa-
tion, 15 RAND J. EcoN. 404 (1984); Rosenberg & Shaven, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought 
for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INTI.. RE.v. L. & EcoN. 3 (1985). In contrast, many economic 
articles on civil procedure that presuppose bargaining as the background to litigation have im-
plicitly adopted the cooperative approach. See, e.g., Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 
J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1986); Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation. 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1984). The cooperative approach can, as these articles demonstrate, be useful if one 
wants a stylized off-the-shelf model to help study the effects of some other legal rule - a sensible 
course of action so that research on other questions does not come to a complete halt while 
awaiting a satisfactory noncooperative account of bargaining. 
55. See Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 54 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS 286 (1951). It may be 
that given the opponents' strategies, alternative strategies are equally good for a player. In this 
case Nash equilibrium requires only that each player's selection be weakly optimal: that is, one 
of the set of equally good options. For a general introduction to the Nash criterion, as well as a 
discussion of some of the refinements that have been suggested for it, see Kreps, Nash Equilib-
rium, in III THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF EcoNOMICS 584 (1987). 
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applications in legal scholarship over the decades. 56 But modem re-
search on bargaining has revealed that additional theoretical refine-
ments, concerning information and the timing of the parties' 
strategies, need to be imposed on bargaining models if useful results 
are to be obtained. Without these modifications, many games - espe-
cially those in which the parties lack full information about their situa-
tion - have multiple Nash equilibria. 
The most important of these refinements arise in strategic interac-
tions that unfold over a period of time as opposed to instantaneously; 
these types of interactions are commonly referred to in the formal 
literature as sequential or extensive games. Rationality in sequential 
games, it is usually felt, entails an additional requirement beyond the 
unprofitability of individual deviation, which I refer to as sequential 
rationality. A rigorous definition of this concept turns out to be fairly 
subtle, but the intuitive idea is straightforward. A given strategy or 
sequence of decisions is sequentially rational if and only if each possi-
ble shorter sequence of decisions contained within the strategy as a 
whole is itself an optimal strategy when evaluated from the later van-
tage point at which the subsequence begins. 
The practical meaning of sequential rationality is that no threat 
can affect behavior unless the threat is credible. Alternatively, a 
promise to take some action in the future will not be believed if it is 
common knowledge that at the time of obligation it will not be in the 
promisor's interest to carry out the promise. "Common knowledge" 
in this context has a technical meaning; it implies that the opposing 
party knows that carrying out the threat is not in the threatener's in-
terest, that the threatener knows that the opponent knows this, that 
the opponent knows that the threatener knows that the opponent 
knows, and so on. 
An illustration of this is provided by the finitely repeated version of 
the familiar prisoners' dilemma game. In the one-shot prisoners' di-
lemma, individually rational behavior by the players leads to a collec-
tively undesirable outcome. Those finding this outcome unappealing 
have often suggested that repetition of the game would allow the play-
ers to escape the dilemma, since cooperation in earlier rounds could be 
rewarded in kind in later rounds. But if the repetition is only for a 
finite number of rounds, the proposed solution is not sequentially ra-
56. See, e.g., Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 81 
COLUM. L. REv. 295 (1987) (applying the concept to antitrust); Birmingham, Legal and Moral 
Duty in Game Theory: Common Law Contract and Chinese Analogies, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 99 
(1969) (applying the concept to contracts); Wiley, Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
556 (1987) (antitrust). 
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tional. 57 For in the last round, which from the ex post perspective is 
equivalent to the one-shot game, there can be no later reward to coop-
eration. The players will therefore be unable to restrain themselves 
from acting selfishly in that round - and this is common knowledge 
between them. As a result, cooperation in the next-to-last round 
yields no reward either, leading the players to act selfishly in that 
round also. And so on, as the chain of reasoning unravels all the way 
back to the first round of play. 5s 
If each party's strategy is a sequentially rational response to every-
one else's strategy, the resulting configuration is referred to as a se-
quential equilibrium, or alternatively (if the game is one of full 
information) as a subgame pelfect equilibrium. As David Kreps has 
explained: "If at any point in an extensive game, all players agree on 
what has transpired, then 'what remains' is, by itself, an extensive 
game. We might require that, in such circumstances, players expect 
that the agreement for this subgame constitutes a Nash equilibrium for 
the subgame." 59 
A simple application of the difference between Nash and subgame 
perfect equilibrium is found in the example of an immaterial breach of 
contract. 60 Suppose a seller has substantially performed a contract to 
sell, but that the goods delivered do not precisely accord to the con-
tract description. Since the goods as delivered are worth slightly less 
than the goods as promised, in theory the buyer may recover damages 
equal to the difference in value. 61 Although the potential damages are 
less than the anticipated cost of bringing suit, the buyer may nonethe-
less threaten to sue in hopes of inducing the seller to cure the defective 
performance. If the buyer actually sues, however, both the buyer and 
seller will be worse off. 
Suppose the sequence of events requires the seller to decide 
whether to cure before the buyer decides whether to bring suit. In this 
case, the seller's possible strategies are to cure or not to cure, and the 
57. See D. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 98-99 (1957). 
58. Repetition of the prisoners' dilemma can support cooperation ifthe players are uncertain 
when the game will end, or if the repetition goes on infinitely, or if there is some uncertainty 
whether one of the players actually prefers cooperation for its own sake. For further details, see 
E. RAsMUSEN, supra note 49, at 88-96. 
59. Kreps, supra note 55, at 586. Actually, there is a minor technical distinction, unimpor-
tant for our purposes, between the concepts of sequential equilibrium and subgame perfect equi-
librium. See id. at 586-87. 
60. The example is taken from Leif, Injury, Ignorance and Spite - The Dynamics of Coercive 
Collection, 80 YALE LJ. 1 (1970). 
61. According to U.C.C. § 2-714(1) (1987): "Where the buyer has accept<;d goods and given 
notification •.• he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss resulting in 
the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined in any manner which is 
reasonable." 
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buyer's possible strategies (which become relevant only if the seller 
does not cure) are to carry out the threat to sue or not to carry out the 
threat. One possible outcome is for the buyer to resolve to carry out 
his threat, and for the seller to cure. This is technically a Nash equi-
librium, because neither wants to deviate from his equilibrium strategy 
given that the other does not. If the buyer will sue absent a cure, the 
seller prefers to cure; and if the seller is going to cure, the buyer loses 
nothing from his threat to sue. 
This game has a second and more plausible Nash equilibrium, 
however, which is for the seller not to cure and the buyer not to sue. 
Neither wants to switch strategies given the other's strategy; if the 
buyer is not going to sue, the seller does not want to cure, and if the 
seller is not going to cure, the buyer does not want to sue. Only this 
second outcome . is a sequential equilibrium. The problem with the 
first equilibrium is that the buyer's threat to sue is not credible; once 
the breach has occurred, it no longer pays to carry out the threat. 
Furthermore, because the seller knows this (more precisely, because it 
is common knowledge), she can safely decide not to cure. 
The sequential equilibrium concept better captures our intuitions 
about the outcome of this game - which are that cure is unlikely if 
the buyer cannot commit in advance to sue. That is not to say that 
buyers do not have remedies other than suit with which to encourage a 
perfect tender. They may appeal to moral suasion, promises of future 
business, or the like. Still, the most effective means of enforcement 
likely will be those that are credible - or in game-theoretic terms, 
sequentially rational - such as not dealing with an offending party in 
the future. 
These examples demonstrate the method of backwards induction 
for finding the sequential equilibria of games with full information. 
One first looks to every decision that is the last in some possible se-
quence of decisions (in this case, the buyer's decision whether to sue). 
For each of these terminal stages, one determines the optimal choice 
for the player whose turn it would be to decide, were that stage of the 
sequence ever to be reached. This completed, one then determines 
what the optimal choice would be in each possible penultimate stage, 
given the choices that can be expected at the terminal stage. One can 
then proceed to the antepenultimate stage and reason backwards 
through the entire sequence of decisions, eventually reaching a sequen-
tial equilibrium for the game as a whole. Through this process, for 
example, cooperation unraveled in the finitely repeated prisoners' di-
lemma game. 
The method of backwards induction is applicable only in games of 
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full information, where the actions taken and the parties' payoffs are 
common knowledge. The full information assumption may not be 
completely realistic in every situation, but in some it may be an accept-
able approximation. For instance, the simplest case of a full-informa-
tion bargaining game is presented by single-offer negotiation, when 
each side knows the other's assessment of the bottom line. Imagine I 
own a book that I value at $5 and that you value at $15, that these 
valuations are common knowledge, and that negotiation takes the -
form of a single take-it-or-leave-it offer. In this example, sequential 
equilibrium implies that the party lucky enough to be in the position of 
the offeror gets virtually the entire surplus from exchange. If I am the 
offeror, I do best to offer to sell for $14.99, which I know you will 
accept; and if you are offeror, you do best to offer to buy for $5.01, 
which you know I will accept. 62 · 
It is frequently useful to present bargaining games diagrammati-
cally; this representation is often called the extensive form of a game. 
The extensive form, or tree diagram, specifies the sequence in which 
the players act, what they know when they move, the role of any 
chance occurrences, and the payoff to each player at the end of each 
possible combination of choices. It is a generalization of the decision 
tree diagram widely taught in schools of business administration, in 
which a single decisionmaker plots out the various consequences of all 
her possible choices. A game tree with multiple players is similar, ex-
cept that each branch specifies whose turn it is to act and what that 
actor knows. The method of backwards induction can be described 
metaphorically as starting with the endmost tWigs on a tree diagram 
and successively pruning unused branches until one reaches the main 
trunk. 
The tree diagram for the take-it-or-leave-it game just described is 
shown in Figure 1. The temporal sequence proceeds downwards from 
the top of the diagram; first the seller decides on an offer, and only 
then does the buyer have an opportunity to respond. At the end of 
each terminal branch, an ordered pair - two quantities in parenthe-
ses, separated by a comma - indicates the net payoffs to both sides. 
62. It should be evident from this example that the assumption of full information rarely will 
be satisfied in practice. In reality, it is difficult for one party to Jmow the other's valuation of 
relevant outcomes with precision, especially if one allows the possibility of nonmonetary or 
psychic aspects of value. Furthermore, willingness to engage in exchange may depend upon 
one's view of the fairness of the transaction, so that private valuations and the price paid may be 
interdependent. See Kahneman, Knetch & Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: 
Entitlements in the Market, 16 AM. EcoN. REv. 728 (1986) (discussing evidence of this phenom-
enon in experimental settings). Accordingly, it is probably a good idea even in single-offer nego-
tiation for the offerer to leave her opponent with a nontrivial share of the surplus, while still 
finding out as much as feasible about the opponent's bottom line. 
240 
Notation: 
V: buyer's valuation of good 
C: seller's valuation of good 
P: sale price of good 
Accept 
(P-C, V-P) 








The first quantity in the ordered pair refers to the seller's net gain or 
loss, and the second quantity refers to the buyer's net gain or loss. 
The take-it-or-leave-it game illustrates an essential point about se-
quential games: a change in the order of events can substantially alter 
the outcome. Clearly it matters to the outcome which party gets to 
make the offer. More technically, the order of events determines 
which of a game's multiple Nash equilibria are sequential equilibria. 
Recall the immaterial contract breach example discussed earlier. The 
unique sequential equilibrium was for the seller not to cure and the 
buyer not to sue. Now suppose instead that the buyer could commit 
to suit before the seller decides whether to cure, perhaps by hiring a 
particularly aggressive lawyer on retainer. In this case, the buyer's 
threat to sue in event of an immaterial breach will become credible. 
Since the seller then believes the threat, she will choose to make a 
perfect tender. And given that perfect tender is rational for the seller 
once the buyer has committed to sue, the buyer will want to commit to 
sue so long as the cost of commitment is less than the value of ensur-
ing a perfect tender. 
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One could view the opportunity to precommit as adding an addi-
tional stage to the sequence, and could imagine continuing with addi-
tional preceding stages: the seller might precommit to spend a large 
amount in litigation, guaranteeing that even if the buyer precommits, 
both buyer and seller will lose money. If the seller can precommit 
before the buyer has the chance to, the buyer's threat to precommit is 
no longer credible, and vice versa. In this competition, having the first 
move confers great advantage, just as being the offeror does in single-
offer bargaining. 
In many actual bargaining environments, though, the full-informa-
tion assumption is unrealistic. In order to get an accurate description 
of the strategic structure, what information each player has and when 
she has it must also be specified. This turns the game into one of in-
complete or asymmetric information. If one specifies the informational 
structure carefully, however, and if one assumes that parties under-
stand the extent to which their information is incomplete, sequential 
equilibria for these games can be found, using techniques that have 
only recently come into wide use among applied economists. 63 
While the methods for solving incomplete information games are 
technical, their underlying principles are intuitively straightforward. 
Even when information is incomplete, the players still may have some 
more or less reliable sense of the possible situations and types of oppo-
nents they might be facing. Similarly, each player will have some 
more or less accurate beliefs regarding the relative likelihood of each 
of these alternatives. Following the approach of modern decision the-
ory, each player's beliefs can be modeled as if they satisfied the re-
quirements for a subjective probability distribution over the relevant 
domain of possibilities. Each player is then viewed as making an opti-
mal choice under conditions of uncertainty. She does this by maxi-
mizing her expected level of welfare given her beliefs about the relative 
probability of relevant events and her attitudes toward risk. Further-
more, her beliefs satisfy a requirement I call Bayesian rationality: she 
updates her beliefs about relative probabilities ai every point along the 
way, drawing optimal inferences about her opponents' private infor-
mation from their observable actions according to Bayes' rule of poste-
63. The theoretical innovations necessary to derive optimal strategies in incomplete informa-
tion games were not developed until the late 1960s and 1970s. The seminal contributions gener-
ally are regarded to be those of Harsanyi, Games with Incomplete Information Played by 
''Bayesian" Players (pts. 1-3), 14 MGMT. Sci. 159, 320, 486 (1967-1968); and Selten, Reexamina-
tion of the Perfectness Concept far Equilibrium in Extensive Games, 4 INTL. J. GAME THEORY 25 
(1975). Wide application of the theory did not arise until the 1980s, following the work of Kreps 
and Wilson and ofMilgrom and Roberts on predatory pricing. See, e.g., Kreps & Wilson, Repu-
tation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. EcoN. THEORY 253 (1982); and Milgrom & Roberts, 
Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information, 50 EcONOMETRICA 443 (1982). 
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rior probabilities. 64 
The importance of subjective beliefs for the outcome of incomplete 
information games requires an additional restriction on the equilib-
rium. The most generally accepted concept of equilibrium under these 
circumstances is the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, in which the players' 
beliefs about the expected frequency of relevant events are accurate on 
average, though not in every instance. In particular, their beliefs 
about the likelihood of other players' actions correspond to the actual 
frequencies with which their opponents choose those actions in 
equilibrium. 
This requirement is sometimes referred to as the rational expecta-
tions assumption, and has been the subject of some controversy in the 
literature. Its appeal stems from the following argument: in a setting 
of imperfect information, one would expect that the players' subjective 
probability beliefs evolve from their own past experience in the mar-
ket, or from some communication with other market participants. 
Yet, for the outcome of strategic behavior to be stable, the players' 
probability beliefs must also remain stable. If individual probability 
beliefs diverged substantially from actual population frequencies, util-
ity-maximizing actors would find it in their interest to update their 
estimates from their own experience and from market reputations. 
Accordingly, the original divergence between probability beliefs and 
actual frequencies would not be stable in the long run and is not a 
plausible candidate for equilibrium. 6s 
Even if one finds this line of argument persuasive, the amount of 
time and learning needed to reach a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is an 
empirical question. If the necessary time is large then an equilibrium 
analysis may not be appropriate for either descriptive or normative 
purposes.66 Nonetheless, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium provides a 
useful benchmark that may illuminate, if not approximate, the behav-
ior of individuals in environments where they must take actions based 
on their subjective beliefs about an uncertain reality. 
64. On the economic theory of choice under uncertainty, see generally H. RAIFPA, DECISION 
ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968). For a dis-
cussion of Bayes' rule, including philosophical arguments for and against its application, see 
Good, Subjective Probability, in IV THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OP EcONOMICS, 
supra note 49, at 537-42. Issues related to the application of Bayes' rule should be familiar to 
scholars and teachers of the law of evidence. See generally Lempert, The New Evidence Scholar-
ship: Analyzing The Process of Proof. 66 B.U. L. REv. 439 (1986). 
65. But see, for example, the classic article by Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Un-
certainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). 
66. A discussion and defense of the rational expectation assumption may be found in 
Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of War-
ranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387 (1983); see also Cooter, Marks & Mnookin, 
supra note 50, at 231-33. 
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To summarize: in this Part, I have described the primary game-
theoretic tools in common use among economists, and how economists 
have used these tools to study the bargaining problem. Although the 
literature on bargaining is a burgeoning one, and while there is sub-
stantial controversy regarding the direction of its futtire development, 
there are no good alternatives to game theory if one wishes to investi-
gate strategic incentives using the paradigm of rational choice. Ac-
cordingly, I argue that the limited understanding now available is 
worth applying for the insight it can provide. Such insight cannot be 
achieved, however, by just picking up a particular game-theoretic 
model and plugging a specific institution into it. Before using game 
theory to model real problems, its limitations must be carefully evalu-
ated. Accordingly, the next Part attempts to outline both- the major 
shortcomings of modern game theory and the main practical problems 
involved in applying it. This helps cultivate the informed judgment 
needed to apply the theory to the complicated and often confusing 
contexts in which actual bargaining takes place. 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH: 
SOME CAVEATS 
Which actions are individually rational in any particular strategic 
setting depends critically on a variety of determinants, including the 
range of individual characteristics and preferences of the participants, 
the sequence in which players can make binding commitments, and 
the players' information about their opponents' preferences and about 
the opponents' prior and contemporaneous decisions. Specifying all 
the relevant factors for any actual institutional process is a formidable 
task. As with any attempt to use abstract theory for pragmatic pur-
poses, we must devise a model of the reality we are trying to explain. 
The goal of modeling is to dispense with the more inessential features 
of reality in order to develop a tractable description of its more impor-
tant aspects. 67 Constructing a useful model requires not just technical 
skill in symbolic or even verbal manipulation, but sophisticated judg-
ment in selecting which aspects of a complex reality to include. De-
scriptive accuracy must be balanced against parsimony and elegance. 
The enterprise is in significant part an aesthetic one. 6s 
67. While the modeling approach has been criticized by some more traditional legal scholars 
as uselessly abstract, such critics fail to understand that the filtering out of complexities inheres 
in any heuristic reasoning, either verbal or symbolic. For sympathetic yet self-critical introduc-
tions to the methodology of modeling, see, for example, E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRI-
MER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 8-21 (1978); Gibbard & Varian, Economic Models, 75 J. PHIL. 664 
(1978). 
68. As Donald McCloskey has observed, a good model is like a good metaphor. D. Mc-
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The demands of modeling make applying game theory to specific 
problems particularly challenging. In general, game-theoretic models 
suffer from a lack of robustness compared with other economic models 
in common use.69 By this I mean that their conclusions are highly 
sensitive to the particular specifications chosen. In addition, the rela-
tionship between premise and conclusion is often discontinuous, so 
that in game-theoretic models - especially when incomplete informa-
tion and timing are important to the strategic structure - approxi-
mately correct assumptions need not lead to approximately correct 
predictions. 
This differs from the study of market behavior generally. A major 
reason that the model of perfect competition has been influential 
among economists, for example, is that it is robust with respect to 
variations in its specifications. Economists' confidence in the model 
does not stem solely from the theorems they have developed that hold 
that perfectly competitive markets are Pareto efficient. It also stems in 
important part from informal arguments, as well as the occasional so-
called "limit theorem," showing that almost perfectly competitive 
markets are, in a certain well-defined sense, almost Pareto efficient. 70 
Bargaining theory contains few limit theorems, so that each assump-
tion can thus pose subtle yet critical modeling choices. As a result, 
judgment, common sense, and a sensitive attention to institutional de-
tail loom much larger here than they do in other fields of applied 
economics. 
A. Selecting the Best Formal Model 
Correctly identifying all the relevant players is the first critical step 
to building a useful model. Market structure may determine whether 
offers come from many buyers and sellers or just a few. It also may 
affect the informational background, since competition from similarly 
situated individuals may provide incentives for players to reveal what 
they would otherwise not. Whether parties bargain themselves or 
have subordinates negotiate on their behalf also affects the outcome, 
Cl.OSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF EcONOMICS 74-83 (1985). For the interested reader, McCloskey's 
book provides a particularly thoughtful discussion of the aesthetics of modeling. 
69. I am not going to be able to provide an exhaustive critique of the game-theoretic ap-
proach; instead, my purpose here is to warn newcomers of the sorts of problems typically en-
countered. For fuller discussions, see the sources listed at supra note 49. A more fundamental 
critique of the entire enterprise has been put forward by Binmore, Modeling Rational Players, (pt. 
1), 3 EcoN. & PHIL. 179 (1987); and Binmore, Modeling Rational Players, (pt. 2), 4 EcoN. & 
PHIL. 9 (1988) (standard approach to rationality logically unattainable in theory; recommends 
modeling rational players as finite automata). 
70. See, for example, J. TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 226-28 
(1988), and sources cited therein. 
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since differences between the interests of principals ·and their agents 
may augment the strategies available - a phenomenon familiar to any 
attorney who has ever tried to settle a lawsuit. The creation of the 
original arrangement between principal and bargaining agent also 
could itself be viewed as part of the game. 71 
Second, intelligent modeling will require that the sequence of 
choices be specified carefully, since a formal model will be unreliable if 
it arbitrarily excludes available strategies players might wish to adopt 
under the right circumstances. Much can tum on whether the bar-
gaining must end by some determinate date or time, or whether it can 
in principle continue indefinitely. Similarly, it may matter a great deal 
whether the parties expect to repeat their negotiation at some point in 
the future. The opportunity for additional rounds of play may en-
courage the parties to cooperate, since uncooperative behavior now 
may be punished later. Opportunities to develop reputations for fu-
ture use substantially enriches the array of possible rewards and pun-
ishments that the parties can bring to bear.72 As even the simple 
models of the previous Part demonstrated, the omission of opportuni-
ties to commit to later actions, or even to make investments that alter 
the payoffs from later actions, can materially alter a model's predic-
tions. The opportunity to reconsider decisions after additional infor-
mation becomes available, or even to delay, can substantially expand 
the parties' strategic possibilities. It is not difficult to construct addi-
tional variations on this theme. 
Third, specifying the informational setting of negotiation is essen-
tial and extremely delicate. If the structure and sequence of informa-
tion is imprecisely formulated, the model's implications will be 
unreliable and perhaps incoherent. 73 For instance, the capacity of one 
player's earlier action to influence another's depends on the later 
player knowing about the ear lier's decision. If neither party learns the 
result of the other's action until after making her own choice, the two 
decisions are effectively simultaneous for strategic purposes, regardless 
of their actual temporal sequence. 
71. One can imagine that both the client's private information about and the attorney's inter-
nal assessments of the merits of the client's position would influence the contractual arrangement 
they select - and that the form and content of the arrangement, if publicly verifiable, could 
signal this information to the opponent. 
72. Compare Galanter, Why the ''Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SocY. REv. 95, 97 (1974) (stressing distinction between "one-shot" and 
"repeat" players in litigation). 
73. The philosophical paradox known as "Newcomb's problem" provides a classic illustra-
tion of the confusion that can arise when the informational structure of a game is not precisely 
described. See, e.g., Nozick, Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice, in EssAYS IN 
HONOR OF CARL G. HEMPEL 114 (N. Rescher ed. 1969). 
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The predictions of bargaining models can also differ depending 
upon whether the incomplete information is taken to be one-sided 
(only one party has information that the other does not) or two-sided 
(each party has some information that the other does not). If the in-
complete information is one-sided, the outcome can vary depending 
upon whether the informed or uninformed party makes the first move. 
If the informed party moves first, she risks that her actions may par-
tially reveal her information, since individuals with different informa-
tion generally can be expected to prefer different strategies. For this 
reason, she might imitate the optimal strategy of someone with differ-
ent information or characteristics from her own - that is, to bluff-
in order to mislead her opponent. Alternatively, she might take an 
otherwise irrational action in order to distinguish herself from an imi-
tator. Such phenomena are typically referred to in the economic liter-
ature as signaling. 74 In contrast, when the uninformed party makes 
the first move, her problem is typically referred to as one of screening 
(as when a seller offers a menu of contracts to a buyer of unknown 
characteristics, in hopes of separating out high-valuation buyers from 
the low-valuation buyers). When incomplete information is two-sided, 
bargaining can incorporate both signaling and screening. 75 
The bargaining models presented in the following Parts of this arti-
cle will present difficulties of all these sorts, and may therefore ulti-
mately require us, in the course of explaining the effects of the rules of 
offer and acceptance, to consider aspects of contracting seemingly far 
removed from the initial formation of agreement. While one might 
have hoped that an analysis of offer and acceptance rules could be 
confined to bargaining at the formation stage alone, the contract's ulti-
mate enforceability and the availability of remedies for breach will in-
fluence the earlier negotiations. For this reason, ironically, more 
orthodox legal scholars may ultimately find themselves more comfort-
able with the game-theoretic approach than with the price-theoretic 
techniques that so far have been the primary methodology of law and 
economics. In a sense, game theory lends support to the traditional 
maxim that the law is a seamless web - that all that does happen 
depends on all that might have happened. Nevertheless, such a tru-
74. Various phenomena arising in actual contracting may be motivated as signaling behavior. 
A possible example is liquidated damages in excess of the promisee's expectation, which might be 
adopted to signal the promisor's private information that the probability of breach will be low. 
The institution of secured credit also has been explained in this way. See, e.g., Schwartz, A 
Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989). 
75. See, e.g., Ordover & Rubinstein, A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Infor-
mation, 101 Q.J. EcoN. 879 (1986) (haggling arises as each party delays the bargain in simultane· 
ous attempt to signal the low value she places on it and to screen the opponent's value). 
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ism, while instructive, is not any more helpful to the practice of mod-
eling than it is to the practice of constructing particular doctrinal 
arguments. Attempting to consider all possible eventualities just 
makes it impossible for us to focus attention on any issue in particular. 
We simply will have to exercise pragmatic judgment in choosing a 
model and interpreting the results we derive from it. 
B. Limitations of the Game-Theoretic Approach 
In addition to those considerations making it difficult to select 
among game-theoretic models, the framework as a whole is vulnerable 
to more basic criticisms that question the degree of rationality and 
coordination it requires of the participants. One such objection chal-
lenges the descriptive usefulness of the concept of equilibrium. The 
appeal of the Nash equilibrium stems from its stability once estab-
lished, since no single player finds it in her interest to deviate from it. 
One might legitimately ask, however, how such an outcome is ever 
supposed to be reached in the first place. 
A common response is that if the game were played repeatedly, the 
players would through some process of adjustment converge to an 
equilibrium. This response, however, both requires empirical defense 
and suffers from a theoretical difficulty. If the parties understand at 
the outset that the game is to be repeated, then the situation should be 
viewed not as many individual games but as a single long one. The 
equilibria of such a repeated game, for the reasons previously dis-
cussed, may be very different from the equilibria of the individual one-
shot games that make up its rounds. 76 
A second and perhaps more appealing response is provided by the 
. notion of common knowledge. If all parties know the structure of the 
game, and all know that the others know this (and so on), then each 
should be able to deduce not just her own optimal strategy but also the 
optimal strategies of the other players. It follows that the individual 
players could calculate the Nash equilibrium themselves. Because 
they know that all the others can do the same, they should realize that 
it is the only sensible result. 
Readers skeptical of formal models may question whether actual 
bargainers are capable of such an intricate chain of reasoning. For 
relatively simple games, however, the Nash equilibrium may be suffi-
ciently obvious and appealing that parties will find it. There is in fact 
empirical evidence suggesting that experimental subjects participating 
76. See generally Fudenberg & Maskin, 11ze Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discount-
ing or with Incomplete Information, 54 EcoNOMETRICA 533-54 (1986). 
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in supervised bargaining situations do manage to reach Nash equilib-
ria.77 The bargaining games I have been discussing, however, are stra-
tegically richer than the typical laboratory experiment, and generally 
have multiple equilibria. The existence of multiple equilibria raises 
significant theoretical difficulties for the establishment of any particu-
lar one. It is not clear how parties could converge on a given equilib-
rium outcome through simultaneous deduction, because no individual 
player can be sure that the others are aiming for the same equilibrium 
that she is. Moreover, even if players could coordinate their strategies 
and select a single equilibrium, it is unclear how to predict which one 
they will choose. 78 
A more fundamental objection is that actual strategic situations 
are sufficiently complex that one may lack confidence in the ability of 
human players even to calculate their own optimal strategies. In the 
words of one eminent game theorist: 
For a long time it has been felt that both game and economic theory 
assume too much rationality. For example, the hundred-times repeated 
prisoners' dilemma has some 22100 pure strategies; all the books in the 
world are not large enough to write this number even once in decimal 
notation. There· is no practical way in which all these strategies can be 
considered truly available to the players. On the face of it, this would 
seem to render statements about the equilibrium points of such games 
... less compelling, since it is quite possible that if the sets of strategies 
were suitably restricted, the equilibria would change drastically. 79 
While limited human capacity to consider all possible strategies may 
render implausible the predictions of overly complicated models, how-
ever, it need not undercut the game-theoretic approach as a whole. 
The fact that human rationality is bounded, rather, should increase 
the usefulness of simple models of bargaining as opposed to complex 
ones. So long as our own understanding of the strategic possibilities of 
a given situation accords substantially with that of the actual players, 
the strategies we exclude from the model may not be of empirical im-
portance. Whether this is in fact the case, of course, depends upon our 
skill and judgment in capturing the critical elements of actual institu-
tions. Models of bargaining will be most useful if they are built on 
insights arising from practical experience. 80 
77. See, e.g., Plott, Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics, 20 J. EcoN. 
LIT. 148S, 148S-93 (1982). 
78. The multiple equilibrium problem has commanded substantial attention in the theoreti-
cal literature on game theory in recent years, motivating a vigorous debate that centers around a 
variety of proposed conceptual refinements designed to narrow down the set of possible equilib-
ria. So far, however, it is generally agreed that the problem has not yet been satisfactorily re· 
solved. See Kreps, supra note SS. 
79. Aumann, supra note 49, at 478. 
80. Some scholars have conjectured that the explicit incorporation of bounded rationality 
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I hope the foregoing catalog of cautions has not persuaded the 
reader that the game-theoretic approach is so fraught with difficulty 
that the project is not worth undertaking. My intention is, after all, to 
argue that we should devote more attention to understanding bargain-
ing, and I think the game-theoretic approach is better than any other 
one currently available. I have simply tried to set forth the factors 
that must be considered if this project is to be carried out with judg-
ment and prudence. I suspect that readers will find the project to be 
more sensible and appealing after examining some concrete 
applications. 
Accordingly, the next two Parts are primarily intended as illustra-
tive. Given the theoretical limitations I have described, it would be 
audacious to make strong policy prescriptions on the basis of the anal-
yses presented here. Instead, I examine in more detail two particular 
contract doctrines to demonstrate the research program I have in 
mind, as well as the types of insights that might emerge from it. In the 
next Part, I analyze the doctrine of acceptance by silence, using a sim-
ple full-information model of bargaining that can be analyzed using 
the principle of backwards induction. Following this, in Part VI, I 
present a more sophisticated bargaining model that allows for incom-
plete information, and use it to analyze the effects of imposing a duty 
to read the fine print in standardized form contracts. The chief pur-
pose of this latter example is to illustrate the importance of specifying 
the strategic structure of bargaining in careful detail. 
V. A FULL INFORMATION MODEL: ACCEPTANCE BY SILENCE 
In this Part, I consider the rule of acceptance by silence to show 
how even simple bargaining models premised on full information can 
help illuminate the law of offer and acceptance. While I do not mean 
to claim that imperfect information is unimportant in this setting, I 
want to begin with a straightforward example of the research program 
I advocate. The purpose is less to provide a realistically useful analy-
sis of the rule, which was selected in large part to illustrate the tech-
nique, than to show how an analysis might be possible. Nonetheless, 
the full-information analysis can reveal important strategic features of 
existing legal doctrine. s1 
will ultimately make game-theoretic models more robust and will eliminate implausible equilibria 
that cannot be ruled out from the viewpoint of perfect rationality. See, e.g., Binmore, supra note 
69. 
81. Some of the considerations that would arise in a fuller analysis will be alluded to in the 
discussion below. For a more thorough and technical investigation of the doctrine, see A. Katz, 
Transaction Costs and the Legal Mechanics of Contract Formation: When Should Silence in the 
Face of an Offer Be Construed as Acceptance? (1990) (manuscript available from the author). 
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A. The Doctrinal Background 
It is a basic feature of Anglo-American contract law that the per-
son who proposes an exchange has substantial control over the struc-
ture of the bargaining - a fact captured in the maxim that "the 
offeror is master of his offer." The theoretical justification for this 
stems from the principle of freedom of contract. Since the offer, by its 
terms, defines the proposed exchange both in form and in content, the 
offeror a fortiori should have the power to specify what sort of re-
sponse counts as a valid acceptance. According to the Restatement: 
"Acceptance of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms 
thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the 
offer."82 
For instance, an offeror is free to require that acceptance take place 
by a given date, be communicated according to a particular medium 
such as telex, or be written on a certain shape and size of paper. The 
offeror also has power to countermand certain of the standard com-
mon law presumptions that govern contract formation - for example, 
by specifying that any acceptance will not be effective until personally 
received by the offeror. 83 The offeror's control over the form of ac-
ceptance is limited, however, by various rules designed either to pro-
tect the offeree's contractual freedom or other social objectives. 
One important limit on the offeror's power to set the terms of the 
bargain arises when the offeror wishes to specify that the offeree need 
do nothing at all in order to accept. For instance, a seller of goods 
might send a letter stating that a shipment of merchandise will be sent 
in ten days unless the recipient sends a notice of objection. If such an 
offer were valid and the recipient wanted to purchase the goods at the 
stated price, he could merely wait for the goods to arrive. 84 A slightly 
more presumptuous seller might ship the merchandise unordered, 
along with a cover letter stating that the recipient should simply keep 
the shipment if he wishes to buy, and return the shipment if he does 
not. A truly aggressive seller might try to make acceptance arise not 
fro,m inaction, but from some affirmative action that the buyer would 
have taken in the absence of an offer - for example, opening for busi-
ness as usual on the following Monday morning. 
82. RE.s'fATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 50(1) (1979). 
83. The usual rule is that an acceptance is valid upon its dispatch by the offeree. See, e.g., 
RE.sTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 63 (1979): "Unless the offer provides otherwise, (a) 
an acceptance made in a manner and by a medium invited by an offer is operative and completes 
the manifestation of mutual assent as soon as put out of the offeree's possession, without regard 
to whether it ever reaches the offeror •... " 
84. In discussing this model, I adopt the convention that the offeror is female and the olferee 
is male. In the succeeding Part, the convention is reversed. 
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A seller might want to try these approaches for any of a variety of 
reasons. First and most innocently, in those cases where the buyer 
does wish to accept and the seller knows this, the expense of an extra 
communication is saved. Second, the buyer .can enjoy the use of the 
goods at an earlier time (especially when the merchandise is shipped 
along with the offer), which may make the offer more valuable to him. 
Third, putting the goods in front of the buyer may be an effective mar-
keting technique; it may increase the buyer's desire for the goods and 
the price he is willing to pay for them. Fourth, the seller may regard 
this as a way of demanding the buyer's attention in order to get him to 
consider the offer. Fifth, the buyer might be induced by the trouble, 
expense, or inconvenience of affirmatively responding to accept an of-
fer he would not otherwise entertain. Some of these reasons obviously 
are more laudable than others. 
As a matter of prevailing doctrine, however, failing to reply to an 
offer can operate as an acceptance only in certain special circum-
stances. 85 The Restatement summarizes the common law rule: 
(1) Where an offeree fails to reply to an offer, his silence and inaction 
operates as an acceptance in the following cases only: 
(a) Where an offeree takes the benefit of offered services with rea-
sonable opportunity to reject them and reason to know that they 
were offered with the expectation of compensation. 
(b) Where the offeror has stated or given the offeree reason to un-
derstand that assent may be manifested by silence or inaction, and 
the offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends to accept the 
offer. 
(c) Where because of previous dealings or otherwise, it is reason-
able that offeree should notify the offeror if he does not intend to 
accept. 
(2) An offeree who does any act inconsistent with the offeror's owner-
ship of offered property is bound in accordance with the offered terms 
unless they are manifestly unreasonable. But if the act is wrongful as 
against the offeror it is an acceptance only if ratified by him. 86 
Each of the circumstances listed suggests a different reason for binding 
the offeree, corresponding to the main justifications commonly offered 
in favor of the more basic duty to keep promises. The chief implicit 
rationale of subsection (l)(a) is restitution. When the offeree silently 
and knowingly appropriates the benefits of offered services, and he had 
85. See McGlone v. Lacey, 288 F. Supp. 662 (D.S.D. 1968) (defendant lawyer's silence was 
not assent to handle plaintiff's tort claim against a third party, though statute of limitations ran 
on claim eight weeks after lawyer received plaintiff's letter authorizing the representation); Pres-
cott v. Jones, 69 N.H. 305, 42 A. 352 (1898) (insured's silence was not assent to renew fire 
insurance policy, though insurer stated it would issue a renewal unless notified otherwise). A 
survey of the relevant precedents is found in Grosse, Silence as Acceptance, 9 S.U. L. REv. 81 
(1982). 
86. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 69 (1979). 
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a reasonable opportunity to reject, he will be unjustly enriched if he 
does not pay, so his silence is conventionally taken to imply consent. 
If the services were of no actual benefit, in contrast, there would be no 
enrichment; and if there were no reasonable opportunity to reject, any 
enrichment would not be unjust. s7 The rationale applies only to serv-
ices because unlike goods, services cannot be returned once bestowed. 
An analogous principle animates subsection (2), however, because if 
goods are offered under similar circumstances and the offeree actually 
uses them, disgorgement usually will be a less than perfect remedy.ss 
The chief implicit rationale of subsection (1 )(b ), in contrast, is reli-
ance or estoppel. If the offeree is led to believe that he can accept by 
silence and attempts to so accept, he may rely on the existence of a 
bargain in various ways. Enforcement of the original offer is necessary 
on this theory to protect the offeree's change of position, which may be 
difficult if not impossible to prove directly - especially if reliance 
takes the form of forgoing substitute exchanges. s9 The reliance ration-
ale can cut both ways, of course. Even if the offeree does not wish to 
accept, an extended and otherwise unnecessary silence on his part can 
induce the offerer to infer acceptance and to rely. ~n the view of 
(l)(c), the offeree might reasonably be demanded to reject affirmatively 
in order to protect the offerer's reliance interest.90 
87. A hypothetical I have used in my contracts class involves the windshield washing serv-
ices motorists can obtain on New York City street comers while waiting for red lights to change. 
Is there a reasonable opportunity to reject? Native New Yorkers disagree among themselves. 
88. A provision of the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 749, 
found in 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (1988), reverses the rule of § 69(2) for goods delivered through the 
U.S. mails; many states have enacted similar statutes. The statutory language suggests a legisla-
tive purpose to protect consumers unfamiliar with the common law rule from fraud or 
intimidation: 
Mailing of unordered merchandise. 
(a) Except for (1) free samples clearly and conspicuously marked as such, and (2) merchan· 
dise mailed by a charitable organization soliciting contributions, the mailing of unordered 
merchandise or of communications prohibited by subsection (c) of this section constitutes an 
unfair method of competition and an unfair trade practice [under the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act]. 
(b) Any merchandise mailed in violation of subsection (a) of this section, or within the 
exceptions contained therein, may be treated as a gift by the recipient, who shall have the 
right to retain, use, discard, or dispose of it in any manner he sees fit without any obligation 
whatsoever to the sender. All such merchandise shall have attached to it a clear and con· 
spicuous statement informing the recipient that he may treat the merchandise as a gift •••• 
(c) No mailer of any merchandise mailed in violation of subsection (a) of this section, or 
within the exceptions contained therein, shall mail to any recipient of such merchandise a 
bill for such merchandise or any dunning communications. 
39 u.s.c. § 3009 (1988). 
89. The reliance rationale is underscored by the Restatement's requirement that the offeree 
subjectively intend to accept - a qualification otherwise uncomfortably at odds with the general 
trend in modern contract doctrine toward an objective theory of assent. I discuss the objective-
subjective tension in the doctrine at greater length in section V.C below. 
90. An illustration of this possibility is found in the case of Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-
Tomado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N.W. 403 (1931), where an insurance company retained a 
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The third rationale - that of bargain - is suggested by the phrase 
"because of previous dealings" in subsection (l)(c) and to a lesser ex-
tent underlies the other subsections as well. Silence will be acceptance 
if the parties have agreed on such an arrangement for their mutual 
convenience. For example, when one joins the Book-of-the-Month 
Club one consents, in exchange for certain up-front benefits, to partici-
pate in the Club's negative option plan. The bargain rationale should 
in principle extend to implicit agreements as well as explicit ones, 
though their existence may be more difficult to establish in practice.91 
None of these rationales, however, provides a real account of why 
silence should qualify as acceptance in some situations and not in 
others. Instead, they merely characterize the exceptions to the general 
rule rather than explain them. For instance, the unjust enrichment 
rationale assumes that an offeror can in some circumstances either pre-
sume the offeree's consent or legitimately put him to the trouble of a 
response. Otherwise the offeror has either acted officiously or with 
donative intent, and the offeree's retention of proffered benefits ought 
not to be viewed as unjust.92 If we presume initially that silence is not 
a valid form of acceptance, it is hard to see why an offeror should 
reasonably expect compensation when providing goods or services in 
the absence of some affirmative indication on the offeree's part that the 
efforts are desired. 
Similarly, the estoppel rationale presupposes its conclusion, since it 
requires that any reliance be a reasonable response to the other party's 
behavior in order to deserve protection. It is hard to see why reliance 
on silence would be reasonable given a background rule that silence is 
not ordinarily an authorized form of acceptance. Only if the basic 
background rule were otherwise would reliance on it be reasonable; 
farmer's application and deposit for a hail insurance policy for an extended period after the 
application was solicited, and then rejected the application just hours before a severe hailstorm. 
Although the application was never accepted explicitly, the court found that the insurer's reten-
tion of the farmer's offer past the time that insurance could be obtained elsewhere breached an 
implied duty to respond within a reasonable time. What made the Kukuska result particularly 
compelling was that the insurer's silent retention of the deposit effectively prevented the appli-
cant from applying to any other insurer. 
91. It should be apparent that any arrangement under which the parties contract out of the 
ordinary rules of offer and acceptance must be established by "previous dealings," that is, prior 
to the offer in question. An unsolicited offer that designates silence as acceptance cannot prop-
erly be interpreted as an offer to vary formation rules between the parties. In order to be legally 
cognizable such an arrangement needs to be formed according to the rules in force at the time of 
the offer, and not according to the hoped-for rules the parties are trying to establish. 
92. If the offerer is ignorant of the background rule regarding silence as acceptance, it might 
be unjust to take advantage of her ignorance. But over time, as the convention becomes estab-
lished, the number of those ignorant of the rule should be few. Requiring restitution would then 
be an instance of the general equitable principle that it is wrong to profit from another's igno-
rance, but would not justify a specific doctrinal exception to the law of acceptance. 
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but then legal obligatiOn could be founded directly on the background 
rule rather than indirectly on the reliance. 
In addition, while the consent rationale can explain why parties 
who have made their own arrangements regarding the meaning of si-
lence are entitled to have those arrangements respected, it cannot ex-
plain why parties should have to contract into a rule of silence as 
acceptance rather than contract out of it. Clearly we might have a 
regime in which silence was generally understood as acceptance, and 
still respect the wishes of individuals who want to arrange that this 
default rule would not apply to their private dealings. The Restate-
ment does not tell us why such a regime is inferior to the one we hap-
pen to have. 
The commentators also have justified existing doctrine in terms of 
customary understanding alone. Both Williston and Corbin ground 
their defense of the black-letter rule on the rationale that ordinarily 
the parties will not reasonably expect silence to indicate assent. This 
is, of course, merely an argument that such expectations reflect the 
present rule, not that the present rule is preferable.93 More recently, 
Farnsworth, the current Reporter to the Restatement, has explained: 
"[A]n offeree's silence in the face of an offer ... is not ordinarily an 
acceptance, because the offeror has no reason to believe from the of-
feree's silence that he promises to buy."94 
All these standard responses, like the more general arguments for 
promise-keeping on which they are based, reflect a perspective of con-
vention maintenance. They arise from the need to describe and main-
tain the preexisting convention regarding whether silence is to be 
taken as assent, but when offered to justify that convention they are 
unhelpful. In order to explain what the default rule should be a priori, 
one must offer reasons that can distinguish between alternate conven-
tions. For instance, one might argue on libertarian grounds that ac-
93. "Generally speaking, an offeree need make no reply to offers, and his silence and inaction 
cannot be construed as an assent to the offer; but the relations between the parties or other 
circumstances may have been such as to have justified the offeror in expecting a reply, and, 
therefore, in assuming that silence indicates assent to his proposal." WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 
§ 91 (3d ed. 1957) ("When Silence and Inaction May Amount to Assent"). Similarly, Corbin 
states: 
Silence may indicate that the offeree did not hear or receive or understand the offer; or it 
may indicate that he preferred to give no thought to the offer and to waste no time and effort 
in making a reply, whether orally or by a writing. In such cases, the offeror is not reason-
able in giving to the offeree's mere silence an interpretation that he accepts •••• 
[The exceptions to the rule] are all cases in which the conduct of the party denying a 
contract has been such as to lead the other reasonably to believe that silence, without com-
munication, would be sufficient. 
CoRBIN ON CoNTRACTS §§ 72, 75 (1963). 
94. E. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS § 3.15 (1982). 
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ceptance by silence should be the exception rather than the rule, to 
protect the offeree's right to be let alone. This comes closer to sug-
gesting a functional justification for the prevailing doctrine, but does 
not by itself explain the commonly articulated exceptions. Nor does it 
spell out either the distributive or allocative consequences of the rule, 
or just how it protects the offeree's privacy. 
With a simplified account of contract bargaining, however, some of 
the functional consequences of the common law rule and its various 
alternatives can be examined. Before developing a formal presenta-
tion, however, let me try to provide some heuristic motivation for the 
modeling choices I have made. To fix a specific image in the reader's 
mind, I will speak throughout as if the offeror is a seller of goods and 
the offeree is a buyer, but nothing in the argument turns on this char-
acterization. While a host of strategic considerations might be incor- 1 
porated into the analysis, my objective at the moment is to be a 
parsimonious rather than an exhaustive modeler. Accordingly, I have 
tried to identify the minimal set of considerations needed to make the 
model useful and interesting. 
Which features of the problem are the essential ones? To begin 
with, the model must provide an opportunity for at least two messages 
to pass between the parties, to admit an alternative to silence as a 
mode of acceptance. Second, some positive cost should be associated 
with a message; otherwise all opportunities for communication would 
be exploited. Third, the model should admit a variety of possible sell-
ers' costs and buyers' valuations, for otherwise full efficiency could be 
achieved trivially by a rule that either decreed or forb~de an exchange, 
depending upon whether the buyer's valuation was greater or less than 
the seller's cost. Fourth and finally, the contract price should be de-
termined endogenously within the model rather than prescribed at the 
outset, because parties can find mutual advantage in bargaining 
around the constraints of legal rules only by adjusting price. 
I have deliberately omitted from the model a number of interesting 
and important complications. I ignore the possibility that the parties 
to an exchange may want to engage in reliance investments, although 
the cost to the parties of an additional communication may be inter-
preted to incorporate the costs of such reliance. Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, I also abstract from the costs of enforcing contracts in the 
courts ex post. I am effectively assuming either that enforcement is 
costless or that individuals are led by considerations of reputation to 
keep their contractual obligations.95 In a full analysis of contract bar-
95. I defend this decision on the grounds that problems of costly enforcement have been 
acknowledged and widely analyzed in the law and economics literature, and that my main pur-
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gaining, of course, the remedial provisions of the law would at some 
point have to be considered. 
One last doctrinal clarification, related to the issues of modeling I 
have been discussing, is necessary before turning to the substantive 
discussion. I use the term "offeror" in this and in the next Part to 
refer to the person who initiates the bargaining. In actual practice, 
however, many communications that initiate bargaining do not legally 
qualify as offers, even if the parties refer to them as such in ordinary 
parlance. As a matter of technical doctrine, a communication request-
ing or suggesting an exchange is not an "offer'' unless it would be 
reasonably understood to empower its recipient to create a binding 
contract by simple assent.96 If more than one additional communica-
tion is necessary in order to conclude the exchange, for example to 
settle its secondary terms, then no offer has yet been made. 
This distinction does not arise in the formal model, which assumes 
that the bargaining is of a take-it-or-leave-it form. A more realistic 
model of bargaining would incorporate several bargaining stages, and 
admit that a number of communications are often necessary before 
either party even reaches the point of inviting the other to make an 
offer. I will speak in this Part, however, as if the bargaining process 
contains just two relevant communications - the offer and the accept-
ance. I therefore will ignore the parties' ability to make counteroffers, 
not to mention the additional possibilities of revocations, withdrawals, 
and temporizing responses. Even so stylized a simplification as this 
will reveal important effects of prevailing legal doctrine on the out-
come of negotiation. Although it may be helpful to interpret the 
model as focusing only on the penultimate stage of negotiations, one 
should keep in mind that strategically important features of the law 
may be suppressed in the analysis. 
B. The Formal Model 
Consider a bargain over the sale of a book. Suppose the seller's 
cost of providing the book, denoted as C: and the value that the buyer 
attaches to the book, denoted as V, are precisely measurable. I will 
pose here is to illuminate the process of precontractual bargaining. See, e.g., Kaplow, Private 
Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1986); Menell, A Note on Private 
Versus Social Incentives to Sue in a Costly Legal System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 41 (1983); Polinsky 
& Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability, 17 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 151 (1988); Shaven, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal 
System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982). 
96. The standard definition is found in the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 24 
(1981): "An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify 
another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it." 
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refer to these quantities as the seller's and buyer's respective reserva-
tion prices. The strategic sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 2, 
with earlier events appearing toward the top of the diagram. Initially, 
the seller must decide whether to offer the book for sale at all. If she 
does make an offer, she must also select a specific price, which is de-
noted as P. It costs the seller a fixed amount, denoted as S, to send or 
otherwise communicate the offer to the buyer, but this cost need only 
be paid if an offer is actually made. If the seller makes no offer, the 
bargaining ends without g~ or loss for either side. This outcome is 
denoted by the ordered pair (0,0) that appears at the end of the 
rightmost branch in Figure 2. If the seller does make an offer, on the 
other hand, the buyer is then faced with a decision whether to accept, 
reject, or ignore the offer. I assume that it does not cost the buyer 
Notation: 
V: buyer's valuation of good 
C: seller's valuation of good 
P: sale price of good 





(P-S-C, V-R-P) (-S, 0) (-S,-R) 
(P-S-C, V-R-P) (P-S-C, V-P) (-S,-R) 
Figure 2. Acceptance by silence 
(0,0) 
Common law regime (I) 
Silent acceptance regime (II) 
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anything to read and consider the offer, and that he actually does so.97 
If the buyer simply ignores the offer after reading it, he thereby incurs 
no direct cost, although depending on the legal rule in force, the inac-
tion may obligate him to purchase the book. In order affirmatively to 
reject or accept the offer, however, the buyer must communicate a re-
turn message to the seller; and the cost of his response is denoted as R. 
Following the buyer's decision, the bargaining ends, and trade takes 
place if and only if a contract was formed under the legal rule that 
happens to be in force. I assume that the established legal rule and the 
specific values of all relevant parameters - V, C: S, and R - are 
common knowledge. 
The parties' respective gains or losses in the series of events that 
can follow an offer will depend upon the legal rule in force. The bot-
tom two lines of Figure 2 show the payoffs under two alternate doctri-
nal regimes. The first set of payoffs, labeled (I), are those that follow 
under the usual common law rule, which holds that no contract is 
formed unless the buyer explicitly accepts. 98 The second set of 
payoffs, labeled (II), correspond to a hypothetical legal regime in 
which silence implies acceptance. 
Under the first regime, the payoffs at the end of each sequence of 
events are calculated in the following manner: If the buyer explicitly 
accepts the seller's offer, the seller receives the sales price P, and incurs 
production cost C and communication cost S for a net payoff of (P - S 
- C). The accepting buyer nets (V -R -P); he enjoys value V, incurs 
communication cost R, and must pay P to the seller. If on the other 
hand the buyer explicitly rejects the seller's offer, the parties' payoffs 
are (-S, -R); no sale is concluded, but each side loses the cost of a 
message. Finally, if the buyer ignores the seller's offer, the buyer 
neither gains nor loses anything, and the seller loses S, the cost of 
sending her offer initially. 
Under the second regime, the payoffs following any explicit re-
sponse by the buyer are the same as under the common law. The only 
difference occurs if the buyer ignores the seller's offer, in which case 
the offer is accepted by silence. In this case, the seller nets (P - S - C), 
just as if the buyer had explicitly accepted, and the buyer nets (V - P) 
(value less price, and no costs spent responding to the offer). 
Since the game is one of full information, the outcome can be 
found in straightforward fashion through the method of backward in-
97. The model of form-contract bargaining presented in the following Part relaxes this 
assumption. 
98. I ignore the complications of Restatement section 69(l)(b) for the moment, returning to 
it in the next subsection. 
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duction. First, one looks to see what the buyer would find rational to 
do if faced with an offer to buy, and then one finds the seller's optimal 
offer given the buyer's expected response. Focusing on the buyer, it 
should be obvious that he will never choose to reject under the first 
regime or accept under the second. In either case he can do strictly 
better by remaining silent and saving the cost of a response. Under the 
common law he will simply choose between accepting and ignoring, 
and will accept if and only if his net gain from doing so is positive. 
This will be the case if the price offered is sufficiently low; that is, if P 
< V-R.99 
Under the silent-acceptance regime, alternatively, the buyer 
chooses between rejecting and ignoring, and will reject if and only if 
his loss from remaining silent is greater than the cost of a response. 
This will be the case if the offered price is sufficiently high; that is, if 
P > V + R. Since she can anticipate the buyer's reaction, the seller 
when making an offer will in either case want to set her price just low 
enough to induce the buyer to purchase. Offering a lower price than 
necessary fails to maximize her profits; offering a higher price is subop-
timal because she is better off saving the cost of a message than making 
an offer she knows the buyer will reject. 100 
Notice that under either regime there exists some maximum 
amount - call it the buyer's net reservation price - that the seller can 
obtain from the buyer in a sale. The buyer's net reservation price dif-
fers under the two regimes, however, and is lower under the common 
law. This is because in order to get the buyer to accept under the 
common law, the price must be below his gross valuation V by enough 
to justify spending R on a response. To get buyer to accept under 
regime II, in contrast, the price can be above his valuation by as much 
as the cost of a response, since he must spend that amount in order to 
avoid being bound. It follows that the price charged by a rational 
seller will equal V + R under regime II and will equal V - R under 
regime I. The difference between the two prices will be exactly twice 
the buyer's cost of responding. 
For the final step in the induction, we must determine whether an 
offer will be made at all. Because the seller can always earn a return of 
zero by doing nothing, and because making an offer is costly, she will 
99. I assume that if the buyer is indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing, he 
chooses to purchase. Similarly, I assume that if the seller is indifferent between selling and not 
selling, she chooses to sell. This simplifies the discussion and makes no difference to the analysis. 
100. This particular feature of the model is an artifact of the full-information assumption. In 
a more complicated analysis, sellers who are uncertain of their customers' reservation prices will 
generally want to make an offer that will be rejected by low-value buyers, in order to get a higher 
return from high-value buyers. 
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want to make an offer if and only if the maximum price she can obtain 
will cover her combined costs of production and communication. 
Under regime I, this will be the case if and only if V - R > C + S. 
Under regime II, it will be the case if and only if V + R > C + S. 
We can now summarize the equilibrium outcomes under each of 
the alternate legal regimes. Under the common law, the equilibrium is 
for no offer to be made when V - R < C + S, and otherwise for an 
exchange to be concluded at price P = V - R. Under the silent-ac-
ceptance rule, the equilibrium is for no offer to be made when V + R 
< C + S, and otherwise for an exchange to be concluded at price P = 
V+R. 
The analysis predicts that fewer sales will take place under regime 
I than under regime II. Only when the gross potential surplus from 
trade, (V- C), exceeds the sum of the two communication costs, R + 
S, will the seller offer an exchange that the buyer will accept under the 
common law. In contrast, for this to occur under regime II, the gross 
surplus from trade must exceed the difference of the two communica-
tion costs - which is necessarily less than the sum. Intuitively, a 
buyer of given valuation is more willing to accept a higher price under 
regime II; for this reason a seller facing a given production cost is 
more willing to make an offer initially. 
Since the sum of communication costs is necessarily positive while 
the difference may be negative, regime II, but not the common law, 
permits slightly inefficient exchanges to take place. Indeed, this will 
occur whenever the cost of a buyer's response exceeds the seller's cost 
of an offer, and when production cost C is not too greatly above the 
buyer's value V. Grossly inefficient exchanges cannot take place even 
under regime II, however, because if C is too far above V, the buyer 
will reject any offer that the seller would want to make - and the 
seller, anticipating this, will make no offer. 
Regime II might therefore appear inefficient. On the other hand, 
regime II does allow those marginally desirable exchanges that under 
the common law are not worth the cost of a response. It also allows 
those sales that would occur under either regime to be concluded with 
one message rather than two. A more complete accounting is neces-
sary to resolve the issue. 
The relative efficiency of the two regimes is compared graphically 
in Figure 3. The horizontal axis on the graph measures the potential 
surplus from a sale gross of any communication costs, (V - C), an 
amount that varies among types of buyers and sellers. The vertical 
axis measures the net social surplus that remains after buyers and sell-
ers exercise their optimal strategies and all costs of communication are 
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subtracted out. This net surplus depends upon the legal regime in 
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Figure 3. Welfare effects of differing acceptance rules 
This dependence is shown in Figure 3 by two lines. The common 
law rule is represented by the broken and kinked line marked "Regime 
I." This line coincides with the horizontal axis of the drawing for 
values of (V - C) to the left of the point marked S + R (for the sake-of 
legibility, it is drawn slightly above the axis), and rises dollar-for-dol-
lar to the right of that point. This is because a sale takes place under 
the common law if and only if (V - C) exceeds S + R. Net social 
surplus therefore equals zero for (V - C) less than S + R, and equals 
(V - C - S - R) for (V - C) greater than S + R (a deal requires two 
messages, the cost of which must be deducted to find net surplus). 
The silent-acceptance rule is represented by the dotted line marked 
"Regime II," which coincides with the horizontal axis for values of (V 
- C) to the left of S - R (it is drawn slightly below the axis for legibil-
ity), jumps downward at that point, and rises dollar-for-dollar ·to the 
right of it. Under the silent-acceptance regime, a sale takes place if 
and only if (V - C) exceeds the lower cutoff point S - R. When (V -
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C) is less than that cutoff point, there is no offer and social surplus is 
zero. When (V - C) is above that cutoff point, the net social surplus is 
(V - C - S) - gross surplus less the cost of one message. 
Not surprisingly, Figure 3 reveals that neither legal regime is uni-
formly more efficient under all circumstances. Instead, which regime 
is best depends on the value of potential gross surplus (V - C), and 
there are three relevant ranges of this quantity. When (V - C) is less 
than the difference in communication costs S - R, as will be the case 
for parties with sufficiently small or negative gross surplus, the two 
regimes are equivalent in efficiency terms: no sale will be made and no 
messages will be sent under either formation rule. 
For an intermediate range of values, where gross surplus (V - C) is 
less than the cost of a seller's message S but greater than the difference 
between the two message costs, S - R, the common law regime is more 
efficient. No sale takes place under the common law, and a wasteful 
sale takes place under the alternative regime. The regime-II sale is 
wasteful because the gross social surplus obtained is less than the cost 
of sending the seller's offer. The seller finds this profitable, since she 
profits from the offer's nuisance value, but the buyer's loss exceeds the 
seller's gain. The advantage of avoiding such opportunistic offers cor-
responds graphically to the shaded triangular area marked A in Figure 
3. 
Finally, when the parties' gross potential surplus (V - C) exceeds 
the cost of the seller's message S, the silent-acceptance regime is supe-
rior. The reason for this differs slightly, depending upon whether the 
gross surplus is greater or less than the sum of both message costs. 
When gross surplus is greater than the cost of one message but less 
than the cost of two messages, a sale will take place under regime II 
but not under regime I. Since under regime II the sale can be con-
cluded with a single message, it is socially desirable, although margin-
ally so. The efficiency gain from such marginal sales corresponds to 
the triangular area marked B in Figure 3. When gross surplus is 
greater than the cost of two messages, a sale will take place under 
either regime. But it is cheaper to achieve this with one message 
rather than two, and the cost savings from doing so corresponds to the 
unshaded quadrilateral area marked C in Figure 3. 
Since neither regime is uniformly superior, the overall efficiency 
ranking of the two depends on their average performance over the en-
tire heterogeneous population of buyers and sellers, and thus on the 
frequency distribution of the various possible costs and valuations. 
This analysis cannot provide unambiguous support, therefore, for any 
universal theory of the efficiency of the common law, such as that 
November 1990] Game Theory and Contract Formation 263 
prominently associated with the work of Richard Posner. In fact, 
under some reasonably plausible assumptions regarding the -distribu-
tion of reservation prices, just the reverse conclusion follows. For in-
stance, suppose it is just as likely for gross surplus to fall in the low 
range bounded by the difference in communication costs S - R and the 
seller's communication cost S, as it is to fall into the medium range 
bounded by the seller's cost S and the sum of communication costs S 
+ R. Since the ranges are of equal width, this supposition seems plau-
sible in the absence of contrary evidence.101 It follows then that the 
advantage of the common law regime in avoiding marginally wasteful 
sales (depicted by area A) exactly balances the advantage of the silent-
acceptance regime in achieving the marginally desirable sales that the 
common law regime misses (depicted by area B). The silent-accept-
ance regime then comes out ahead on balance, because the sales that 
would take place under either regime are achieved at lower cost (area 
C). 
Alternatively and perhaps more simply, if the cost of the buyer's 
return message is small in magnitude, then the silent-acceptance re-
gime is more efficient than the common law. To see this, observe that 
the costs represented by all three areas A, B, and C in Figure 3 are 
small when R is small. The costs represented by areas A and B, how-
ever, are doubly small; not only is the efficiency difference per ex-
change small, but the number of buyers and sellers falling into those 
zones is also small. Hence, area C outweighs area A in magnitude, and 
the savings from consummating trade with a single message dominates 
any countervailing advantages of the common law rule.1°2 
One hesitates to draw any very strong conclusions from the forego-
ing analysis, given its illustrative character and the simplified assump-
tions that went into it. The model can be interpreted, nevertheless, to 
suggest that some of the specific common law exceptions· of the Re-
statement are justifiable on efficiency grounds. For instance, if the of-
feree has "reasonable opportunity to reject" proffered services 
(subparagraph (l)(a)), the cost to him of a response is presumably 
small, in which case acceptance by silence is the efficient rule under 
my analysis. The cost of declining to exercise dominion over proffered 
101. A possible objection to this argument is that I have implicitly and unwarrantedly as-
sumed that the buyer's response cost is the same under either legal regime. One important rea-
son why it might not be is that the seller might be able to influence it by the nature or timing of 
her offer, and that her incentive to do this will depend on the legal rule in force. I consider this 
possibility more fully in section V.D below. 
102. In the technical calculus of infinitesimals, the efficiency gains measured by Care offirst-
order magnitude (small in height, but not in width) while the gains measured by areas A and B 
are of second-order magnitude (small in both height and width). 
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goods is probably also small under most circumstances; accordingly, 
the rule in subparagraph (2) that makes the exercise of such dominion 
operate as an acceptance may be efficient as well. 
Conversely, even when the cost of a buyer's response is large, ac-
ceptance by silence can still be more efficient, so long as either the 
surplus from exchange is sufficiently large or the chances are high that 
it is large. The limiting case of this, of course, is the physician who 
furnishes medical services to an unconscious pedestrian, in the belief 
that the pedestrian will pay for them upon regaining consciousness. 
Here the offeree's response cost is very high, although not infinite (the 
pedestrian could arrange in advance to carry on his person a card 
specifying the conditions under which he will accept treatment). 
Nonetheless, it is efficient to presume that the pedestrian consents to 
pay, and the law of restitution does just this.103 The presumption only 
extends to services likely to be of high value, though, since the offeree's 
high cost of responding could otherwise subject him to all sorts of 
unwanted offers from officious if not opportunistic volunteers. 
The language of subparagraph (l)(c) that evokes the parties' con-
sent can also be justified in efficiency terms, though of a different sort. 
If individual pairs of buyers and sellers have reason to think they will 
fall into the group for whom acceptance by silence is preferable, it is of 
course efficient to allow them to opt for that regime. But this is simply 
an instance of the generic efficiency argument for freedom of contract, 
rather than an explanation of the particular doctrine in question. 
From the standpoint of efficiency, it is harder to find support in the 
model for the strong presumption of both the Restatement and the 
common law against interpreting silence as acceptance. This is not to 
say, however, that the traditional presumption could not be justified 
on some other basis such as distributional fairness or the substantive 
right to privacy. Some might view the silent-acceptance rule as un-
fairly rewarding opportunistic behavior on the part of offerors, to an 
extent outweighing any efficiency gains that it could otherwise achieve. 
Indeed, if the conclusions of the formal model are to be believed, 
the silent-acceptance rule is open to severe objection on just these 
grounds. When goods are exchanged under that regime, not only does 
the buyer get none of the surplus from the exchange, but he winds up 
losing an amount equal to his cost of sending a response. The seller's 
ability to force the buyer to expend resources to avoid an unwanted 
offer gives her a strategic advantage, with the result that the buyer 
103. Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907); In re Crisan Estate, 362 Mich. 
569, 107 N.W.2d 907 (1961). 
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actually ends up in a worse position after the exchange than if the offer 
had never been made.104 For this reason, those arrangements in which 
parties contract out of the common law rule typically provide some 
up-front benefits to the offeree, like the introductory bonuses com-
monly offered by book clubs. Such loss leaders may be necessary to 
induce the offeree to enter into the arrangement at all, since he must be 
compensated ex ante for the opportunism he can expect from the of-
feror ex post. 
C. A Variation on the Model: Subjective Intention To Accept 
While the foregoing analysis considers only a limited set of strate-
gic choices on the part of the negotiating parties, it can easily be ex-
tended to incorporate more complicated situations. To show how this 
might be done, it is useful briefly to examine an alternative legal rule, 
one that makes the existence of a contract following the buyer's silence 
turn on his subjective intention. Such a rule gives the buyer an addi-
tional degree of freedom when faced with the seller's offer, and this 
alters the strategic structure of the bargaining. 
While the trend of modern contract law favors the objective theory 
of mutual assent, the earlier subjective tradition remains influential, 
both metaphorically (e.g., the "meeting of the minds") and at the level 
of concrete doctrine. An instance of this is found in Restatement sec-
tion 69(l)(b), which on its face actually requires that the offeree sub-
jectively intend to accept at the time of silence in order to enforce the 
bargain later. 
This subsection of the Restatement has received substantial criti-
cism for its inconsistency with the modern objectivist trend. 105 The 
chief problem with it, as with the subjective theory of assent generally, 
is a practical one. Determining the offeree's subjective intentions at 
the moment of the offer is often severely difficult. If the cost of relia-
bly making this determination is high, a subjective test is unworkable; 
the risk is too great that the offeree will want subsequently to misrep-
104. The sharpness of this conclusion is an artifact of the full-information assumption. In a 
more realistic model in which the seller could not be sure of the buyer's reservation price, the 
buyer would typically be left with some of the surplus from any trade that occurred. Even with 
imperfect information, though, buyers could be worse off under the silent-acceptance rule than if 
no offer had issued, while this could never occur under the common law. Furthermore, in all 
situations the silent-acceptance rule gives a relative distributional advantage to the seller. For 
details, see A. Katz, supra note 81. 
105. For instance, Farnsworth calls § 69(l)(b) a "throwback to subjectivism," and elsewhere 
remarks: 
So fundamental is the tenet that mere silence is not acceptance that, even as master of his 
offer, the offeror is powerless to alter the rule .... As it was neatly put by Karl Llewellyn, to 
give that effect to invited silence "in a systematics centering on overt manifestations is, one 
may suggest, almost lewd." E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, at 144, 145. 
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resent his intention if he comes to regret the bargain. Under some 
circumstances, however, the offeree's intention to accept may be verifi-
able ex post at reasonably low cost. He may express such an intention 
to a third party, or may engage in observable actions such as investing 
in reliance or preparing to perform that would not be rational absent 
an intention to complete the bargain. As the comments note: 
The case for acceptance is strongest when the reliance is definite and 
substantial or when the intent to accept is objectively manifested though 
not communicated to the offeror . . . . Even though the intent to accept 
is manifested only by silent inaction, however, the offeror who has in-
vited such an acceptance cannot complain of the resulting uncertainty in 
his position. 106 
While the Restatement's commentary speaks largely in terms of 
fairness, a formal analysis of the situation's strategic structure demon-
strates that a subjective intention rule has allocative consequences as 
well. In particular, a subjective rule can be more efficient than either 
of the two objective rules already discussed. If the cost of determining 
subjective intention is low, an explicit response from the buyer be-
comes dispensable and the cost of making it can be saved. 
The game tree representing the strategies available in a subjective-
intention regime, denoted as Regime III, is depicted in Figure 4. The 
sequence of actions is almost the same as under the two previous re-
gimes, but with one important difference - the buyer has four choices 
following an offer rather than three. As before, he can still expressly 
accept or reject, but now he has two alternatives if he chooses to re-
main silent: he can silently determine to accept, or silently determine 
to reject. The reader should interpret this to mean that the buyer, in 
addition to deciding whether to send an explicit response, also chooses 
whether to take some action, publicly verifiable ex post but uncom-
municated at the time, that entails no additional cost to him so long as 
the contract is formed. This private action could be costly if the con-
tract were not enforced, but for the purposes of the discussion, I as-
sume that by taking it the buyer can guarantee himself a deal. 
If the buyer expressly responds to the seller's offer, the parties' 
payoffs are the same as under the two regimes previously analyzed: (P 
- S - C: V - R - P) if he expressly accepts and (-S, -R) if he expressly 
rejects. If the buyer remains silent, however, he can effectively choose 
by his intention whether or not to be bound. If he intends to accept, 
the payoffs following silence are the same as under regime II: the 
seller gets (P-S - C), and the buyer gets (V -P). If conversely he 
106. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 69 comment c (1981). 
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intends to reject, then the payoffs following silence are the same as 
under regime I: the seller loses S and the buyer comes out even. 
Notation: 
V: buyer's valuation of good 
C: seller's valuation of good 
P: sale price of good 








(P-S-C,V-P) (-S, 0) (-S,-R) 





We again solve for the equilibrium outcome using backward induc-
tion, starting with the buyer's reaction to an offer. It should be appar-
ent that under a subjective-intention rule the buyer will never respond 
explicitly. Whether he chooses to accept or reject, he can achieve the 
same result by silence, and thereby save the cost of a response. His 
decision is therefore simplified to choosing between a silent acceptance 
or rejection, and he will prefer the former if and only if the price of-
fered by the seller is less than the value V he places on the sale. Fore-
seeing this, the seller will want to fix the price exactly at V if she 
makes an offer. Moreover, she will want actually to make an offer if 
and only if this price is enough to cover her combined production and 
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communication costs, (C + S). In summary, an exchange at price V 
will be offered and accepted if and only if the parties' gross surplus 
from exchange, (V - C), exceeds a threshold level equal to the seller's 
communication cost, S. 
Table 1 compares the equilibrium outcomes of all three legal re-
gimes. It shows that more sales will take place under the subjective-
Table 1: The three acceptance regimes compared 
Regime Sale occurs whenever Sale price 
I (Common law) V-C>S+R V-R 
II (Silent acceptance) V-C>S-R V+R 
III (Subjective intent) V-C>S v 
intention regime III than under regime I, but fewer sales will take 
place under regime III than under regime II. This is because the 
threshold level of surplus necessary for a sale to take place under re-
gime III lies between the corresponding thresholds for the other two 
regimes. Under regime I, that threshold is the sum of seller's and 
buyer's communication costs; under regime II, it is the difference be-
tween those costs, and under regime III it is the seller's communica-
tion cost alone. Furthermore, under the subjective intention rule, the 
sale price will be higher than under regime I and lower than under 
regime II because the seller always wants to set price equal to the 
buyer's net reservation price. Under regime I, the buyer's net reserva-
tion price equals the value V he places on the book less his response 
cost R. Under regime II, his net reservation price equals the value he 
places on the book plus his r~ponse cost. Under regime III, however, 
the buyer never needs to respond explicitly to the seller's offer, so his 
cost of doing so does not affect his net reservation price - which is 
just V. Furthermore, the subjective intention rule, if it is practically 
feasible, is strictly more efficient than either of the other rules. To see 
this, observe that if gross surplus (V - C) is less than the seller's 
message cost S, then regime III yields the same result as regime I: no 
sale and no costs incurred. If gross surplus is greater than the seller's 
message costs, then regime III yields the same result as regime II: a 
sale following one message. Because regime I is more efficient than 
regime II when gross surplus is lower than the seller's communication 
cost, 107 and regime II is more efficient than regime I when it is higher, 
107. More precisely, regimes I and II are equally efficient when gross surplus is less than the 
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subjective acceptance combines the best of the other two rules. 
The intuition underlying this conclusion is straightforward. 
Neither a rule that holds silence always to be acceptance nor a rule 
that holds silence never to be acceptance is ideal under all circum-
stances. The former has the disadvantage of encouraging opportunis-
tic and inefficient offers when the gross surplus from trade is slightly 
less than the cost of making an offer. The latter has the disadvantage 
of requiring two communications to be sent when one would suffice. 
The subjective-intention rule, when feasible, avoids both disadvan-
tages. Under it the buyer can safely ignore the threat of opportunistic 
offers by silently rejecting, and can avoid the need· for a redundant 
communication by silently accepting.1os 
My analysis of the subjective-intention rule of section 69(1)(b), it 
must be admitted, rests on some highly special assumptions. Not only 
do I assume that the buyer's intention was costlessly verifiable ex post, 
but I also implicitly assume that early knowledge of whether the buyer 
has in fact accepted is of no particular value to the seller. Under these 
assumptions, giving force to the buyer's subjective intention effectively 
makes his response costless. In reality, though, a seller given early 
notice of acceptance may be able to arrange her affairs to perform at 
lower cost, and thus the buyer may be able to exploit the seller's un-
certainty to his own advantage.109 For this reason, this analysis is of-
fered as much to provide an example of how the basic bargaining 
model might be varied, as for whatever light it may shed on the alloca-
tive effects of this curious doctrinal complication. 
D. Comments on the Model 
A complete treatment of the acceptance-by-silence doctrine would 
take us beyond the scope of the present discussion. Nonetheless, it is 
at least worth flagging some of the important strategic considerations 
difference between message costs, and regime I is more efficient than regime II when gross sur-
plus is greater than the difference between message costs but less than the seller's message cost. 
108. This conclusion can also be viewed as an example of the general tradeoffbetween more 
and less centralized contract rules. The subjective-intention rule is relatively decentralized com-
pared to its alternatives - it effectively delegates the decision of which rule should apply to the 
offeree, who has superior knowledge of the situation at hand. As a general matter, decentraliza· 
tion has the advantage of enabling heterogeneous individuals to minimize transaction costs in 
their personal circumstances. It has the associated disadvantage of raising the administrative 
costs and likelihood of error for the public authorities charged with enforcement. If public ad· 
ministrative costs are relatively low, as when the offeree's intention can be objectively ascertained 
ex post, the decentralized rule will be relatively more desirable. 
109. The Restatement takes the position that the seller, having voluntarily placed herself in 
this position by virtue of inviting the buyer's silence, ought not complain that the resulting uncer-
tainty is unfair. Whether this situation can be faulted on efficiency grounds, however, is a sepa-
rate question. 
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that would arise in a fuller analysis. The foremost among them, in my 
view, are the costs of failed exchanges when the parties' reservation 
prices are not common knowledge, the uncertainty created when the 
offeree's response is delayed, and the possibility that the offeror can act 
strategically to influence the offeree's cost of responding. I briefly con-
sider each of these in turn. 
One striking feature of the full-information case analyzed in sec-
tion V.B is that, in equilibrium, no offer is ever rejected. This is be-
cause the seller never wants to offer a price above the buyer's 
reservation price; since the buyer is sure to reject, she would be better 
off saving the cost of an initial communication. In actual markets, of 
course, the typical seller makes offers that are rejected by some buyers. 
This may be because the seller lacks perfect information about the 
buyer's willingness to pay, or because she deals with several buyers 
who differ in their reservation prices and is constrained to make the 
same offer to all. In either event, the perfect price discrimination im-
plied by the simple model is often not possible. 
The full-information· analysis, accordingly, overlooks an important 
practical disadvantage of the silent-acceptance regime: under it buyers 
have to expend real resources to reject unwanted offers. In a world in 
which most offers are rejected, this disadvantage can be substantial 
and the common law rule looks more appealing. This is not the end of 
the story, however, because acceptance by silence also has a counter-
vailing advantage over the common law, which is not present when 
information is perfect. Sellers who find it costly to make offers and 
who cannot perfectly price discriminate will typically set their price 
above their marginal cost of production. This is most obviously true 
for sellers with some degree of monopoly power, but it is also the case 
in more competitive markets. 110 Such prices are socially inefficient for 
familiar reasons; they inhibit mutually beneficial sales to buyers whose 
reservation prices are above marginal cost but below the seller's price. 
Acceptance by silence helps counteract this efficiency loss from 
supracompetitive pricing, by increasing the likelihood of exchange. 
The formal model also does not incorporate the strategic aspects of 
delay or of the duration of bargaining. It assumes that the buyer 
chooses once and for all whether to accept immediately upon receiving 
the offer, whereas in reality that decision takes place over a variable 
110. The standard neoclassical model of perfect competition cannot be applied in this setting, 
since costly negotiation and communication imply at least some degree of economies of scale. 
Once the seller has made her offer to a potential buyer or group of potential buyers, her costs of 
doing so are both fixed and sunk. She must therefore charge a price above her average cost of 
production in order to break even. For further details, see A. Katz, supra note 81. 
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period of time. In many contexts, the buyer's ability to delay his re-
sponse is an important strategic consideration. By delaying he may 
hope to elicit a more favorable offer from an anxious seller. More sim-
ply, he may speculate against the offer as an option, waiting to see 
whether market conditions or personal circumstances favor going for-
ward with the exchange. 
When the offeree's response requires some amount of time, the of-
feror cannot be sure what inference to draw from the offeree's silence. 
Under the strict common law rule, she will be uncertain whether the 
offeree has rejected or is merely deliberating. Under the silent-accept-
ance regime, on the other hand, she will be uncertain whether the of-
feree is deliberating or has decided to accept by silence. In those 
instances when it is uncertain which regime applies she may be com-
pletely unable to plan her affairs. Uncertainty is magnified when com-
munication is imperfectly reliable, so that silence can also mean that a 
message has gone astray. · 
Most disputes over silent offerees that have actually found their 
way into the case law seem to arise out of just this sort of ambiguity. 
Offerors are most likely to be confused by silence when the silence is 
an extended one, and it is in just this case that the courts have been 
most willing to protect them. 111 In my view, these complications cut 
both ways. Which regime ultimately is preferable will depend both on 
the duration of time involved and on the costs of the resulting uncer-
tainty, which are chiefly those of lost reliance and which may differ 
under alternative legal regimes. Nonetheless, a full analysis must take 
account of those complications. 
Finally, the formal analysis assumed that the parties' costs of com-
munication were exogenously fixed. In reality, buyers and sellers may 
have various opportunities to influence these costs, the most important 
of which is the seller's option to alter the buyer's cost of responding by 
the manner in which she makes the offer. For instance, the seller can 
vary the length of time in which to reply, or can specify a more or less 
onerous medium of response. Or she might even offer to defray a por-
tion of the response cost through her own expenditures. 
The seller has opposite incentives to influence the buyer's response 
cost under the two main rules we have considered. Under the com-
mon law, she wants to make the buyer's response cost as low as possi-
ble, since the lower it is the higher is the buyer's net reservation price, 
and the more he is willing to pay for the goods being offered. Accord-
ingly, she will have the incentive to subsidize the r~sponse whenever 
111. See the authorities cited supra in notes 85 and 90. 
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her resource cost of doing so is less than his. 112 Under the silent-ac-
ceptance regime, however, the seller has the incentive to make the 
buyer's response cost as high as possible, since the higher it is the more 
he is willing to pay for the goods offered. If unchecked, a creatively 
opportunistic seller might send the offer in such cover that the buyer is 
unlikely to discover it, give the buyer an unreasonably short time to 
reply, or require burdensome efforts to order to reject.113 
For this reason, even a legal regime that recognized silence as a 
valid form of acceptance would have to place some limits on the pro-
cedural terms of the seller's offer, in order to prevent the more extrav-
agant versions of opportunism.114 Such limits could not entirely 
eliminate the seller's motive to behave this way, though, and certainly 
could not provide the positive incentives to minimize communication 
costs that the common law does. As a result, the total costs of com-
munication would in most instances be higher under a silent-accept-
ance rule. 
Accordingly, the formal model probably underestimates the im-
portance of offeror opportunism as an explanation for the common 
law rule. When significant, this risk can supply an efficiency argument 
for the offeree's right to be let alone, supplementing the language of 
fairness and reciprocity in which the right is ordinarily defended by its 
proponents. Indeed, this may be the strongest defense that can be of-
fered for the common law rule. 
VI. AN IMPERFECT INFORMATION MODEL: STANDARDIZED 
FORM CONTRACTS 
Readers inclined to question the relevance of representing a com-
plex reality with stylized models will no doubt consider the foregoing 
discussion and its assumption that the bargainers have full information 
112. A mundane illustration of this is provided by the common practice among direct-mail 
marketers of including self-addressed envelopes in their circulars. It is almost certainly cheaper 
for the offerer to mass-produce and mail an envelope with her own address on it than it is for the 
offeree to take the time to find and address one specially. Prepaid postage, in contrast, is less 
widespread though still common. Given the current postal rates for business mail, it may be no 
cheaper for the offerer to prepay the postage, unless one counts the time cost to the offeree of 
rooting around in his desk drawer for a stamp. Unless the offerer has some cost advantage over 
the offeree in communication, there is no point to her arranging to subsidize his response. 
113. As an extreme example, by providing that the offer will be deemed accepted unless the 
buyer takes out a full page advertisement to the contrary in the business section of a national 
newspaper. 
114. In addition to Restatement § 69(l)(a)'s requirement that the offeree have reasonable 
opportunity to reject before being bound, for example, 16 C.F.R. § 425.1 (1990) (Federal Trade 
Commission regulation requiring an operator of a negative-option plan clearly to disclose the 
plan's material terms, and requiring that subscribers be given at least ten days in which to in-
struct the seller not to mail the offered merchandise). 
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overly simplistic. The main purpose of the current section, therefore, 
is to show how more realistic analyses might be constructed and to 
take some steps in that direction. This Part also illustrates the poten-
tial fragility of the game-theoretic approach - how a given set of pre-
dictions can depend sensitively on a particular description of the 
bargaining process. The exercise demonstrates that one should be 
wary of strong assertions in this area until substantial and detailed 
effort is devoted to studying the strategic structure of bargaining. 
The substantive topic I discuss is the interpretation of fine-print 
terms in form contracts. As has long been recognized, in a mass-pro-
duction economy the costs of individual negotiation are high and the 
terms of exchange need to be standardized in some fashion. Conse-
quently, many who participate regularly in the market find it worth-
while to develop stereotypical printed forms which set out the terms 
upon which the drafter proposes to do business. This enables these 
participants to exploit scale economies in determining the provisions 
that maximize their surplus from the transaction, and in drafting the 
written agreement that embodies those provisions. 
If standard forms are actually to economize on the costs of negoti-
ation, each individual exchange cannot provide an occasion for re-
opening every term of the bargain. The fact that some terms are not 
negotiable, on the other hand, does not mean no bargaining occurs. 
Typical forms leave blank space to be :filled with the essential terms 
that are actually dickered - usually price, quantity, and the date of 
shipment or delivery- with the rest largely regarded as "boilerplate." 
In general, one would expect the parties to adjust the negotiable terms 
in individual transactions depending on how the nonnegotiable terms 
affected their individual circumstances. 
If both parties to the exchange completely understood the standard 
forms and also bore the full costs of negotiation, one might suppose 
they would use form contracts whenever the savings in negotiation 
costs outweighed the countervailing advantages of tailoring the ex-
change to their individual needs. Contracting parties, however, often 
purport to accept form offers without knowing or understanding the 
terms within. This is individually rational of them because the cost of 
considering each term is not trivial and many terms deal with the con-
sequences of improbable contingencies. Additionally, the terms are 
often written in fine print to economize on paper and handling, and 
expressed obscurely or in legal or technical jargon, which raises the 
cost of becoming acquainted with them even further. 
In this setting, contract bargaining would most appropriately be 
modeled as a game of imperfect information. The uncertainty is pri-
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marily on the offeree's part, however; because the seller drafts the 
form (or at least chooses among several standard forms), he presuma-
bly has a clearer idea of its provisions. Moreover, imperfect informa-
tion is not the same as no information at all; although buyers cannot 
know without reading what particular terms an individual seller has 
inserted into an offer, they may develop over time a reasonably reliable 
sense of what sorts of terms typically will be encountered in the mar-
ket at large. 
As I suggested earlier, imperfect information models are substan-
tially more intricate than full-information models, and a variety of 
technical issues arise in their analysis. Accordingly, I gloss over a 
number of details and complexities in the argument here, since a more 
rigorous explanation would substantially detract from the exposition. 
Fortunately, much of the heuristic argument can be simplified without 
substantial distortion. For a rigorous presentation of the model, how-
ever, I refer the reader to a technical companion paper containing the 
formal proofs.115 
A. The Doctrinal Background 
Despite their evident advantages, form contracts have been re-
ceived by courts and by legal commentators with ambivalence and, on 
occasion, with suspicion.116 In part, this arises from the association 
some lawyers have drawn between such contracts and the alleged pres-
ence of market power.117 The law's ambivalence toward form con-
tracts, however, goes beyond a party's inability to negotiate all terms 
individually with the offeror. The law also faces a theoretical difficulty 
in finding the requisite mutual assent: on first blush it would seem 
that a person simply cannot freely agree to be bound by an obligation 
without knowing what she is agreeing to. Several solutions have been 
suggested to this problem. Each of them depends to a greater or lesser 
extent on using a fiction; each results in a different rule of 
interpretation. 
115. See Katz, Your Terms or Mine: The Duty To Read the Fine Print in Contracts, 24 RAND 
J. EcON. 518 (1990). 
116. See, e.g., Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 
43 CoLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943); Rakolf, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay In Reconstruction, 96 
HARV. L. REv. 1174 (1983); Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-
making Power, 84 HARV. L. REv. 529 (1971). 
117. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161A.2d69 (1960); Kess-
ler, supra note 116, at 632 ("The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not 
in a position to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the standard contract 
has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses. His con-
tractual intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger 
party .••• "). 
November 1990) Game Theory and Contract Formation 275 
One possible explanation is that in accepting a standardized form 
offer, the buyer agrees to delegate her authority to the seller to set 
whatever nondickered terms he pleases, subject to the broad limits im-
posed by doctrines such as fraud and unconscionability. 118 The typi-
cal doctrinal shorthand for this view is that the buyer has a "duty to 
read" the contract; if she neglects this duty she waives her objection to 
the consequcnces.119 The "duty to read" is often identified as the posi-
tion of the common law at the beginning of this century, though its 
harshness was undoubtedly mitigated by the effect of other doctrines. 
An obvious advantage of this rule is its relative ease of administration, 
since under it one need merely consult a contract's written provisions 
to determine its content.120 
A less extreme version of this position, associated with the later 
views of Karl Llewellyn and endorsed by the Second Restatement, is 
that the buyer assents to the standardized terms of a form offer on the 
understanding that the terms are the same as those regularly accepted 
by others in similar situations. On this view, the law imposes custom-
ary limits on the seller's discretion in order to guarantee the buyer 
equal treatment vis-a-vis other buyers. Among these limits are the in-
corporation of trade usage and course of dealing into the contract; the 
implied duty of good faith, which imposes standards of honesty in fact 
and commercial reasonableness; and the fuzzy constraints of the un-
conscionability doctrine, which protect the buyer against unusually 
oppressive terms.121 This approach results in greater administrative 
difficulty, for courts interpreting standard forms must determine the 
initially uncertain dictates of custom, good faith, and the like. Over 
the long run, however, as courts decide a variety of disputes, these 
criteria are likely to become more clearly understood. 
A third approach would be to interpret the form contract, where 
possible, as containing the set of nondickered terms that is most in the 
buyer's interest. Support for this can be found in the authorities that 
118. As in the previous Part, I will speak as if the seller is the otreror, with no loss of 
generality. 
119. See, e.g., Merit Music Serv., Inc. v. Sonneborn, 245 Md. 213, 221, 225 A.2d 470 (1965) 
("the law presumes that a person knows the contents of a document that he executes and under-
stands at least the literal meaning of its terms"); National Bank of Wash. v. Equity Investors, 81 
Wash. 2d 886, 506 P.2d 20 (1973). 
120. The administrative advantages of the duty to read have often been exaggerated, since 
the written terms of any contract contain ambiguities that are difficult to resolve without refer-
ence to the larger context of the parties' bargain. Proponents of a strict duty to read, accord-
ingly, have tended to combine that position with support for one of a variety of formalistic 
interpretative doctrines, such as the so-called "plain meaning'' or "four comers" rules. 
121. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACI'S § 211(1) (1981) and comments thereto. 
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endorse construing contracts against the drafter. 122 One might also 
describe this as implying a "duty to speak" on the part of the drafter, 
who risks being bound unfavorably if he does not somehow bring the 
content of the standardized terms to the consumer's attention. Propo-
nents of this view argue that the seller knows both that the consumer 
will not read and that it is not reasonable for her to read, and that the 
seller, as creator of the terms, is in a position to bring them to the 
buyer's attention easily and cheaply.123 
Finally, a fourth approach would be to reject mutual assent alto-
gether as the basis for enforcing standardized terms. On this view, the 
buyer assents only to the basic terms of exchange that she actually 
learns of. With regard to the other provisions, the parties have failed 
to reach agreement and the law should treat this just as if the parties 
had left the term open: by implying a term that is fair or reasonable 
under the circumstances.124 This last rationale resembles the ap-
proach of Llewellyn and of Restatement section 206 in its references to 
custom and reasonable dealing. Its distinctive feature, however, is that 
it justifies enforcing implied terms by regulatory authority rather than 
by the parties' presumed intention.125 For this reason, a court apply-
ing this rationale might consider itself justified in departing substan-
tially from the parties' likely wishes in order to reach a socially 
desirable result. In the extreme, this view could justify dispensing en-
tirely with freedom of contract and simply requiring a particular set of 
terms that the parties would not be free to negotiate around even if 
they bargained explicitly. This would at least provide some of the ben-
efits of standardization, albeit on a centralized rather than decentral-
ized basis. While mandatory terms have obvious costs when the 
population of buyers and sellers is heterogeneous, they do save on the 
costs of negotiations.126 
122. See, e.g., REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 206 (1981). 
123. See, e.g., Rakoft', supra note 116. 
124. Cf REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 204 (1981): "When the parties to a 
bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term which is 
essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the circum-
stances is supplied by the court." 
125. This argument is advanced, for instance, by Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: 
The Transformation of Contract Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Pl1T. L. REV. 21 (1984). 
126. Modem American contract law is influenced by all these approaches. The traditional 
duty to read, however, has come under increasing attack in recent years, both by commentators 
and courts. Parties who accept without reading may escape being bound in a variety of circum-
stances; for instance, when the standardized form is illegible or printed in extremely small type, if 
the drafter has used a document, such as a claim check, that is not expected to contain contrac-
tual terms, or if the drafter misrepresents or fails to correct the other party's obvious misunder-
standing of the writing. Courts now widely accept Llewellyn's argument that signing a contract 
does not by itself imply assent to surprising or unusual terms, and commonly limit such terms by 
construing ambiguous language against the drafter. Furthermore, courts have also been increas-
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From a policy perspective, the question of what effect to give the 
terms of a standardized agreement can also usefully be viewed as a 
problem of economic efficiency. In situations where communication is 
costly, some standardization is desirable, but creates offsetting ineffi-
ciencies when contracting parties are heterogeneous. Can we obtain 
some of the benefits of decentralization by letting the drafter fix terms 
unilaterally, or would we do better to put limits on this discretion? 
Given the obvious benefits of standardization, which rule best balances 
the goals of saving on negotiation costs and choosing the terms best 
suited to the individual circumstances? 
B. Baird and Weisberg's Defense of the Duty To Read 
, 
I take as a starting point a recent provocative article by Douglas 
Baird and Robert Weisberg, which addresses these very questions. 127 
To be accurate, they actually discuss a more complicated problem -
the so-called "battle of the forms," which arises when both parties to a 
transaction use standardized but inconsistent forms, and it is necessary 
to decide which will prevail.128 Baird and Weisberg argue that the 
most efficient policy is a formal and d~ntralized rule that defers to 
the language of the later form. 
Traditional American common law arguably provided such a rule 
- the so-called "mirror image rule." Its theoretical rationale was that 
a responding form could not be an acceptance unless it mirrored the 
offeror's form in all particulars. A later inconsistent form could there-
fore only be interpreted as a rejection, and hence a counter offer. If 
the parties attempted to go ahead with the deal notwithstanding the 
ingly willing to interfere with standardized terms on external substantive grounds such as uncon-
scionability and good faith, since they view the freedom of contract considerations that ordinarily 
impede such external doctrines as largely absent in the form-contract setting. See, e.g., Williams 
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
In addition, statutory developments have substantially cut back on the traditional duty to 
read. The Uniform Commercial Code imposes a duty to speak with respect to a variety of con-
tract terms including warranties of merchantability and fitness, and implies an obligation of good 
faith in the performance and enforcement of every contract within its scope. U.C.C. § 2-316 
(1977) ("Exclusion or Modification of Warranties"); § 1-203 ("Obligation of Good Faith"). 
Other state and federal statutes and administrative regulations specifically directed toward con· 
sumers create similar obligations. See, e.g., the Magnuson·Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 2301-2312 (1988), and associated FrC regulations at 16 C.F.R §§ 701-703 (1990); and vari· 
ous sections of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 
127. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 5. 
128. Inconsistency between the forms can also give rise to another sort of dispute, in which 
one party tries to renege on the deal before performance, arguing that no contract was ever 
formed. See, e.g., Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915). 
Few disputes of this sort, however, have been reported in recent years, probably because § 2-
207(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code makes it clear that a contract exists whenever there has 
been a "definite and seasonable expression of acceptance." 
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inconsistency, their doing so would be taken as an acceptance by con-
duct of the offer contained in the later form, which then governed the 
bargain. 
The mirror image rule has been supplanted at least in sales cases 
by section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code. While the inter-
pretation of section 2-207 has been the subject of considerable contro-
versy, the most widely influential view is that section 2-207 directs 
courts to ignore the forms when they conflict, and instead to apply the 
default or "off-the-rack" terms ofU.C.C. Article 2 to fill in any result-
ing gaps. Such default terms for the most part invoke contextual stan-
dards such as reasonableness, custom, or trade usage.129 
Baird and Weisberg accept this majority interpretation of section 
2-207. They argue, however, that the resulting rule is substantially 
less efficient than the mirror image rule. This is the case, in their view, 
because the off-the-rack standards are burdensome for courts to apply, 
and because they impose substantial costs on buyers and sellers whose 
circumstances do not fit the standard mold. In contrast, the mirror 
image rule makes it easier for individual parties to choose terms best 
suited to their particular situation. 
The key to Baird and Weisberg's thesis is their claim that the mir-
ror image rule promotes efficiency in negotiation. They acknowledge 
that the prospect of firing the last shot may encourage parties to insert 
inefficient but unilaterally advantageous terms into their forms. They 
argue, however, that a rule giving legal effect to standardized forms 
will induce some parties to read those forms, and that the prospect 
that some parties will read will induce the drafter to moderate his 
terms. Additionally, the buyer's knowledge that a form contains one-
sided terms will reduce her willingness to enter into the deal and the 
price she is willing to pay, further reducing the gain from opportunis-
tic drafting: 
[T]he mirror image rule, compared to other possible approaches, takes 
maximum advantage of these market forces. It makes printed forms 
matter more by encouraging or even forcing parties receiving documents 
to read them more carefully. The rule thereby encourages parties send-
ing documents to make them attractive to their intended recipients .... 
[T]he seller that does not moderate its self-interest in drafting its 
forms will lose the opportunity to deal with at least some buyers on the 
129. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-305 (price); § 2-306 (quantity); § 2-308 (place of delivery); § 2-309 
(time of payment). I am deliberately glossing over the particulars of the debate over § 2-207, 
since they are incidental to my purpose. For an excellent discussion of the section that also 
provides practical guidance for contracting parties, see generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNI-
FORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE § 1-3 (3d ed. 1988). 
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terms in that form. Its rational self-interest will therefore be to design 
the terms in its form in the mutual interest of the parties. 
Under the mirror image rule, then, each party, in designing its form 
for a particular type of transaction, has an incentive to hypothesize the 
terms that the parties would have settled upon had they dickered over 
them.130 
Under the U.C.C., they argue in contrast, a seller contemplating send-
ing a one-sided form will have no incentive at all to moderate his 
terms, since there is no penalty for not doing so and a possibility that 
the off-the-rack terms will support the one-sided terms.131 
The logic of the Baird-Weisberg argument, if valid, ought to carry 
over in straightforward fashion to those simpler exchanges in which 
only one party uses a standardized form. 132 If Baird and Weisberg are 
correct in their characterization of form-contract bargaining, then 
modem doctrines that limit the drafter's control over contract terms 
also eliminate the parties' incentives to negotiate optimal terms. It 
would follow that the modem trend away from the duty to read is 
misplaced from the standpoint of efficiency. 
Baird and Weisberg's claim has some heuristic appeal in its resem-
blance to familiar economic arguments that sellers will be led by their 
desire to maximize profit to offer optimal contract terms or product 
attributes. Unfortunately, their claim is not well-grounded in any pre-
cise account of the bargaining process, and as a result the recipient's 
incentives to expend resources reading form contracts are obscured. 
Instead, Baird and Weisberg simply assert that it will be in the interest 
of a significant minority of recipients to read the forms sent to them 
before deciding whether to accept. Their entire defense of this as-
sumption is the following: 
Merchants, however, probably do look for, and pay attention to, 
preprinted terms that may prove important in the transaction, including 
terms, such as warranty disclaimers, that turn up so frequently as the 
subjects of reported battle of the forms litigation. [Footnote:] The only 
recent empirical study of which the authors are aware was made in Eng-
land, where the mirror image rule appears to survive. . . . That study 
suggests that parties read at least the more important of the fine-print 
terms, such as warranty disclaimers. Based on a survey of only 19 engi-
neering manufacturers, the study must be regarded as merely 
130. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 5, at 1255, 1257 (emphasis in original). 
131. Baird and Weisberg also address objections that the mirror image rule would encourage 
an endless battle of the forms as each party tried to fire the last shot, and that the rule unfairly 
allows parties to renege on deals before performance. Id. at 1252-53. 
132. Their analysis would fail in this context only if the opposing party's opportunity to send 
her own standardized form in response exerted an independent restraint on the drafter's discre-
tion. While Baird and Weisberg mention this possibility incidentally, it does not play a central 
role in their argument. Id. at 1257. 
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suggestive.133 
While this empirical claim is hardly compelling (Macauley's well-
known and earlier findings to the contrary being at least as persua-
sive), 134 an equally serious problem is that good theoretical reason ex-
ists to doubt that the number of recipients who actually read forms 
will be sufficient to encourage drafters to provide efficient terms. For 
one matter, Baird and Weisberg ignore the incentive for recipients to 
free ride. Since reading and understanding forms is costly, and since 
the benefits of efficient terms are enjoyed by the population as a whole, 
individual recipients might rationally sit back in the hope that others 
will keep the drafters honest. Similarly, no individual recipient would 
spend resources on reading if she believed that all drafters were using 
roughly comparable terms. At least some drafters would have to be 
using suboptimal terms else nothing would be learned by reading.13s 
To be fair, Baird and Weisberg would probably respond that their 
claim regarding the duty to read is not that all drafters would be in-
duced by the threat of detection to include optimal terms; merely that 
most would, or that at least most would be induced to include terms 
that are not so suboptimal as to outweigh the inefficiency of centrally 
mandated terms. But even this weaker claim turns out to be problem-
atic upon more careful inspection. In fact, the formal model I am 
about to present suggests that reading standardized contracts may not 
be rational at all. 136 
Before presenting the formal model, I want to be precise about the 
claim I am making with it. I am not saying that the drafters of form 
contracts have no economic incentives whatsoever to avoid self-serv-
ing contractual provisions - merely that the threat that buyers will 
read is not one of them. In many though not all instances, such an 
incentive is provided by the drafter's desire to maintain a good com-
mercial reputation, since customers surprised ex post by oppressive 
133. Id. at 1253 & n.87 (citing Beale & Dugdale, Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning 
and the Use of Contractual Remedies, 2 BRIT. J. L. & SOCY. 45, 50 (1975)) (citation omitted). 
134. Macauley, supra note 25. 
135. Cf Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Re· 
search. 60 N.Y.U. L. R.Bv. 761 (1985) (explaining similar argument against pure version of the 
efficient market hypothesis in financial economics). 
136. The argument can be taken as an extension of the well·known analysis of markets with 
asymmetric information by Akerlof, The Market for ''Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. EcoN. 488, 488-500 (1970). As Akerlof and others have argued, 
market equilibrium is inefficient when no institution provides information about individual at-
tributes of heterogeneous buyers and sellers. One particular institution that has been widely 
suggested to serve this purpose is the warranty contract. Warranties and analogous promises can 
only provide a solution to the lemons problem and other types of adverse selection, however, if 
individuals find it in their interests to learn about the terms of exchange. The model shows that 
they may lack incentive to do so when co=unication is costly. 
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fine-print terms are unlikely to furnish either repeat or referral busi-
ness in the future. For several related reasons, however, I do not con-
sider reputation or goodwill in the following discussion, assuming 
them to be insufficient to induce the seller to provide the optimal con-
tract terms. 
In the first place, I want to focus my attention on Baird and Weis-
berg's primary justification for the duty to read: that it encourages 
efficient drafting by establishing a credible threat that buyers will read 
the fine print. While they also argue that reputational considerations 
help to encourage efficient commercial behavior, I think this plays 
only a secondary role in their specific defense of the doctrine. Rather, 
the reputational contention is offered more to support their overall ar-
gument for private freedom of contract over centralized regulation. 
Second, legal rules for interpreting contracts matter primarily 
when the effects of reputation are weak. In those situations in which 
the desire for future business is sufficient to induce the seller to provide 
efficient terms, it will often also induce the parties to settle any dis-
putes between them without consulting the law, since the private sanc-
tions resulting from the lost relationship will overshadow any official 
remedy available. On the other hand, if exchange is largely anony-
mous, or if the parties transact business only discretely and infre-
quently, or if for whatever reason (for instance, impending 
bankruptcy) the drafter is concerned largely with the short term, the 
extent to which buyers read the fine print and the consequences the 
law attaches to it become important. 
Third, even if legal sanctions are important to the drafting party, 
his concern for reputation is likely to take the form of waiving or de-
clining to enforce one-sided terms ex post, rather than excluding them 
from the written contract ex ante. Having the tern:is in the writing 
gives a seller the discretion to invest in goodwill in circumstances 
where it is most valuable to do so, while leaving him the option of 
enforcing the contract to the letter at other times. This flexibility can 
be especially vital for the many provisions that deal with the conse-
quences of improbable contingencies, since the contingency's actual 
occurrence may mean that circumstances have substantially changed. 
Furthermore, the goodwill that comes from waiver ex post may be a 
more valuable kind, because insisting on less than one's demonstrable 
legal rights has particular salience. In contrast, a seller may reap little 
credit for offering a proconsumer standard form that no one ever 
reads. 
The fourth and final reason stems from my methodological pro-
gram. A seller's concern for reputation should be understood from a 
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game-theoretic perspective as a rational response to repeated strategic 
interaction with buyers.137 Nevertheless, understanding the parties' 
incentives in the one-shot interaction is an essential prerequisite to un-
derstanding their incentives in the more complicated repeated case. 
Developing a reputation for reasonable contract terms would be un-
necessary, for instance, if all buyers read the fine print, and would be 
impossible if they took no interest in the fine print at all. 
Accordingly, the formal model below focuses on the essential fea-
tures of the form-contract problem: an efficiency cost from subop-
timally chosen contract terms, so that negotiation can realize some 
gain; a positive cost associated with reading others' form contracts or 
explaining one's forms to others, so that explicit negotiation is best 
avoided if possible; and the presence of heterogeneous buyers and sell-
ers in the market, so that a social planner setting the required terms 
cannot achieve the optimal social outcome in every case. As in the 
previous Part, I ignore the costs of contract enforcement. I also as-
sume away the possibility of counteroffers or other related communi-
cations (and in the form contract setting the take-it-or-leave-it 
assumption may seem more plausible). Even this minimalist account, 
however, will show Baird and Weisberg's story to be incomplete. 
C. A Formal Model of the Duty To Read 
As before, we start with the strategic structure - the parties' po-
tential strategies and the relevant sequence of events - which is de-
picted in the game tree of Figure 5. I continue to suppose that the 
transaction involves the sale of a fixed quantity of some good, and that 
the bargaining involves a single seller and a single buyer, who may be 
drawn from a population of various types. 138 The seller initially offers 
an exchange to the buyer, which may or may not be in standardized 
form. 
For simplicity, I will assume only two terms in the offer: price and 
quality. In reality, of course, any standardized offer will include terms 
of two sorts: some ascertainable on their face, and some that are as-
certainable only with a positive cost. I refer to these as patent and 
latent terms. Price should be interpreted as standing for all patent 
terms, and quality as standing for all latent terms. The contract's 
137. See, e.g., Kreps & Wilson, supra note 63; Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 63. 
138. Alternatively, the model may be interpreted to apply to a seller who simultaneously 
makes an offer to an entire population of buyers. In one interpretation, the buyer's characteris-
tics are a random variable drawn from the possible distribution of types in the population at 
large; in the other, the seller deals with all types of buyers at once in proportion to their fre-
quency in the population. Nothing turns on which interpretation one selects. 
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quality may include factors such as the extent of any warranty, the 
extent of seller's freedom to cancel the contract in unforeseen circum-
stances, and the like. Price is denoted by the letter P, and quality is 
denoted by the letter X. It may be helpful to think of quality as vary-
ing along a single dimension, such as a warranty clause that could 
range from "as is" to an unconditional guarantee, although this is in-
essential to the analysis. The analysis would follow along analogous 
lines with multiple dimensions of patent and latent terms. The seller 
may, if he wishes, spend the resources necessary to make quality as 
well as price costlessly ascertainable. He may do this by going to the 
trouble of bringing all relevant terms to the buyer's attention, or per-
haps by promising to reimburse the buyer for any expenses she incurs 
in evaluating the offer. Such an attempt will of course raise the seller's 
marketing costs. The amount the seller must spend to reveal quality 
to the buyer, denoted as S, must be incurred independently of whether 
the buyer accepts the offer. The cost of making a form offer is as-
sumed to be zero. 
If the seller goes to the effort of making all terms patent, the buyer 
then decides, based on both price and quality, whether she wants to 
accept or reject. If the seller does not go to this effort, then the quality 
term will remain latent and the buyer will then have to decide, in light 
of the price and her expectations regarding the probable quality the 
offer is likely to contain, whether to inspect it more carefully. I refer 
to this process of inspection as "reading," although it may also include 
expenses such as consulting an attorney to determine the meaning of 
technical language. Reading the contract requires the buyer to expend 
a positive amount I denote as R, which must be incurred whether or 
not she purchases.139 
If the buyer does not read, she must decide whether to accept or 
reject the offer on the basis of the price alone, combined with her ex-
pectations about the contents of fine print. I' assume that these expec-
tations are rational in the Bayesian sense discussed earlier; in other 
words, they roughly correspond to the actual frequencies of the terms 
that sellers choose to offer in equilibrium. Conversely, if she does read 
139. The cost of reading should be understood as the net cost after subtracting out any en-
tertainment value (probably an empirically unimportant consideration); I assume no one so en-
joys reading standardized forms that they would actually choose to do so apart from evaluating 
the proposed exchange. I am going to ignore the prospect that the buyer can choose to spend a 
variable amount reading the contract, with more effort yielding better information. This does not 
make any difference to the argument. Similarly, the cost of reading could vary among buyers 
without affecting the argument, so long as it were positive for all except a trivial fraction of them. 
See Katz, supra note 115. 
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Notation: 
V(X): buyer's value for good of quality X 
E[V(X)): buyer's expected value for good of uncertain X 
C(X): seller's cost for good quality X 
P: sale price of good 
S: seller's cost of sending individual offer 
R: buyer's cost of reading form offer 
Seller 
(P-C(X), E[V(X)]-P) Buyer (0,0) (P-C(X)-S, V(X)-P) 
reject 
(P-C(X), V(X)-P-R) (0,-R) 
Figure 5. Form-contract bargaining under a duty to read 
[Vol. 89:215 
(-S,O) 
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the form and learns the quality it specifies, she can then decide 
whether to accept oi reject on a fully informed basis. 
The seller's production cost depends positively on the level of qual-
ity promised, so he would like to have that term as low as possible for 
any given price and quantity of sales. The buyer's willingness to pay, 
on the other hand, depends positively on quality and she would like to 
have it as high as possible, other things remaining equal. I refer to the 
seller's cost as C(X) and the buyer's reservation price as V(X), where 
the notation is intended to represent the dependence of price on qual-
ity. Of course, the buyer will be willing to pay a higher price for a 
good of higher quality only if she knows or has reason to believe it 
actually is of higher quality. If the offer is a standard form and the 
buyer does not read it, the price she is willing to pay depends on the 
goad's expected quality. In this case her reservation price is denoted 
as E[V(X)]. 
The extent to which reservation price rises with quality may vary 
among individual buyers. For the sake of exposition, however, I ini-
tially assume that all buyers are equally quality-sensitive; relaxing this 
assumption, which I will do later, 140 makes no fundamental difference 
to the problem. The extent to which cost rises with quality similarly 
can vary among sellers. I do assume that a buyer's willingness to pay 
for quality has diminishing returns, so that successive increases in 
quality produce successively smaller increases in her valuation. Simi-
larly, the seller faces increasing costs, so that successive increases in 
quality produce successively larger increases in production cost. 
These last two assumptions imply that a uniquely efficient level of 
quality exists, which maximizes the potential gross surplus V(X) -
C(X) from exchange, for any particular buyer-seller pair. Under full 
information, if Coasian bargaining were possible, the parties would do 
best to set the quality level where the buyer's willingness to pay for an 
incremental increase in quality exactly equaled the seller's cost of pro-
viding it. I denote this efficient level as X~ and denote the valuation 
and cost when quality is efficiently chosen as V* and C*. 
A description of the parties' payoffs for each possible configuration 
of actions completes the specification of the bargaining. Start with the 
situation, illustrated on the right-hand branch of Figure 5, where the 
seller notifies the buyer of both price and quality. If the buyer accepts, 
the seller nets (P- C(X) - S) (price less production and selling costs), 
and the buyer nets (V{X) - P) (valuation less price). If the buyer re-
jects, the seller loses S, since selling cost is sunk whether or not a sale 
140. See text accompanying note 146 i'nfra. 
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occurs, and the buyer comes out even. If the seller sends a form offer, 
as depicted on the. left-hand branch of Figure 5, four distinct possible 
outcomes arise. The buyer can reject before reading, in which case 
neither party gafus or loses anything. The buyer can read and then 
reject, in which case the seller nets zero and the buyer loses R, the cost 
of reading. The buyer can read and then accept, in which case the 
seller nets (P - C(X)) and the buyer nets (V(X) - P - R). Or finally, 
the buyer can accept without reading at all, in which case the seller 
nets (P- C(X}}, and the buyer's position is an uncertain one. She does 
not know at the time she accepts what quality she will get. Her best 
guess, however, is that she will get the average level of quality avail-
able in the market; she has no reason to think this seller's quality is 
any better or worse than average. Accordingly, if she buys without 
reading, she expects to net (E[V(X)]- P) - the value she attaches to a 
good of average quality, less the price. 
We may now solve this bargaining game. Since the game is one of 
imperfect information, the method of backwards induction used in the 
previous Part does not apply. The method of solution, however, is 
closely analogous. Consider the alternatives of individual and form 
offers in turn. 
If the seller presents the buyer with an individualized offer, he will 
have incentive to provide the efficient level of quality. The argument 
for this is as follows: for any quality level, a fully informed buyer will 
accept if and only if her valuation V(X) exceeds or equals the price P. 
Hence the seller should set price just equal to V(X), earning a return of 
V(X) - C(X) - S. This return differs from the gross surplus only by the 
constant selling cost S. Since selling cost does not vary with the qual-
ity of the good, the seller can maximize his return by maximizing the 
gross surplus - that is, by choosing the efficient level of quality X*. 
The explanation for this result is that since the seller gets to make a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer, he captures the entire surplus from the ex-
change. Hence, it is in his interest to maximize that surplus. 
The case in which the seller makes a standardized form offer is 
more complicated. Nonetheless, it follows from the strategic structure 
that the buyer Win not read the offer and the seller will choose the 
lowest possible quality level. A proof by contradiction prpvides the 
easiest way to see this. Assume arguendo that buyers sometimes de-
cide to read forms when presented with a given price of P, and I will 
show why this cannot be an equilibrium.141 The only reason they 
141. The buyer's decision whether to read could in principle be conditioned on the price or 
other patent terms. As I argue momentarily, however, this possibility makes no difference to the 
buyer's optimal strategy, so I treat price as fixed in the discussion. 
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would read, let us recall, is if sellers provided different quality levels in 
their forms. If all sellers behaved identically, in equilibrium ·buyers 
would realize nothing can be learned by reading.142 · 
Consider the quality level that a seller would specify in a form offer 
under these circumstances. The seller takes the proportion of buyers 
who read as given, because the choice of a single seller is not going to 
alter the buyer's beliefs about the frequency of contract terms to be 
encountered in the market.143 Furthermore, he need only concern 
himself with the reaction of the buyers who read; because the rest 
never learn about the actual quality offered until it is too late and are 
insensitive to it in their purchasing decision. 
For any given price, however, any informed buyer requires some 
minimal level of quality in order to accept the offer, which I call the 
reservation quality level The reservation qualify level for any offer is 
just that amount of quality necessary to provide the buyer with a valu-
ation equal to the price being asked, and make her barely willing to 
accept. The lower the price, the lower is the reservation quality level. 
I denote this level as X(P}, where the notation is intended to represent 
the fact that reservation quality depends on price. · 
Consequently, a maximizing seller would never want to choose 
above X(P). To do otherwise would unnecessarily sacrifice profits, be-
cause a decrease from any higher quality would reduce costs and sacri-
fice no sales. But, since reservation quality is just that level where the 
informed buyer's valuation exactly equals the price, she gains no sur-
plus from exchange. Instead, a buyer who reads must therefore wind 
up with a net loss of R - the costs spent becoming fuformed - if the 
seller is maximizing. Such a buyer could have done better than this (in 
fact, could have lost nothing) by simply rejeeting the offer out of hand. 
In other words, the buyer would have been better off not reading in the 
first place. Yet this contradicts the assumption that reading was a ra-
tional strategy for her, and implies that buyers cannot read in 
equilibrium. : 
If buyers fail to read the fine print, sellers . wri~ing standardized 
forms have every incentive to choose the quality level as low as possi-
ble (recall that reputation is excluded from the .model). The specific 
. " 
142. Formally, in this case E[V(X)j = V(X), so that a rejecting-out-of-hand strategy plainly 
dominates a reject-after-reading strategy, and accepting without reading dominates accepting 
after reading. The point can be generalized. If information is costly, the only reason to gather it 
aside from direct consumption value is to inform some decision to be taken afterwards. If one 
expects to act the same way whatever one learns, then it is better to save the resources and just 
take the action. 
143. Because of the sequential structure of the game, sellers cannot commit to any particular 
distribution of quality before buyers decide whether to read. 
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quality provided would be constrained either by technical considera-
tions, or by whatever other legal doctrines the courts would apply to 
protect a nonreading buyer. Denote this minimum quality level as X<> 
and the seller cost and buyer valuation associated with it as C0 and Vr> 
Since buyers can anticipate that all sellers in equilibrium using form 
offers will choose minimum quality, the most that they will be willing 
to pay is V0• This is the price, therefore, that sellers will offer when 
they use standardized forms. 
Now a seller can earn at most (V0 - Co) from a form offer, and we 
already saw that he could earn (V* - C* - S) by making an individual 
off er. The difference between consumer valuation and production cost 
is at least as large (and generally larger) when quality is set optimally 
than when it is set minimally. It follows that the seller will choose to 
make an individual rather than a form offer only when the increased 
revenues from doing so, (V* - C*) - (V0 - Co), exceed the cost S of 
making the latent terms patent. Since sellers will vary in the costs 
they face in doing this, they will prefer to make individual offers when 
their marketing costs are low, and will prefer form offers when their 
marketing costs are high. This completes the derivation of the 
equilibrium. 
To summarize the analysis: Under a legal regime that places the 
duty to read form contracts on the buyer, reading contracts is not a 
rational strategy for buyers in equilibrium. As a result, providing any 
quality above the minimum possible level is not a rational strategy for 
sellers who use form contracts in equilibrium. This does not mean 
that no quality above the minimum possible level will ever be provided 
under a duty to read. On the contrary, since buyers are willing to pay 
a higher price for increased quality once it is brought to their atten-
tion, it may well be in sellers' interests to provide the efficient level of 
quality and to alert buyers to the fact that they have done so. 144 But 
this will only occur if sellers bear the cost and effort of making the 
quality terms of the offer patent. 
The intuition underlying this perhaps surprising result stems from 
the specific sequential structure of the bargaining. In particular, it 
arises from the quite ordinary fact that buyers must decide whether to 
spend resources reading a standardized form before they know what 
latent terms it contains - and that sellers have the motive to take 
advantage of this, and no means to commit themselves not to. Be-
cause the costs of becoming informed are sunk once incurred, a buyer 
144. Or, if there are multiple aspects of quality, the seller may wish to go to the trouble to 
communicate some of them to the buyer but not others, depending on the cost of doing so 
credibly. 
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can wind up in a situation where, having been informed, she just 
barely wants to accept, while wishing that she had not bothered to 
become informed in the first place. Indeed, if she did read, the seller's 
optimal strategy would be to place her in precisely this situation.145 
Since she can anticipate this turn of events, she prefers not to read 
instead of reading just to get into the position of taking a barely ac-
ceptable deal. 
I have so far assumed that all buyers attach the same valuation to 
quality, and that sellers know these valuations when they set the con-
tract terms. If some buyers were more sensitive to quality than others, 
one might surmise that the relatively sensitive buyers would read form 
contracts even if the less sensitive do not. Furthermore, when buyers 
are heterogeneous, sellers could not be assured of setting price or qual-
ity exactly at the buyer's reservation level, and would want to offer a 
price that low-valuation buyers would reject, in order to get a higher 
price from high-valuation buyers. Accordingly, the precise line of ar-
gument I used above to show that buyers will not read must be 
modified. 
Relaxing the assumption that buyers identically value quality, 
however, does not make any difference to the basic argument. For a 
rigorous explanation why this is so, I refer the interested reader to the 
technical companion paper.146 The nature of the reasoning, however, 
can be easily outlined. Again, the proof is by contradiction. SU;ppose 
that some buyers, possibly with differing valuations of quality, choose 
to become informed. Of this group there must be one whose reserva-
tion quality level is highest (or at least as high as anyone else's); call 
her the most discriminating buyer. Clearly, a profit-maximizing seller 
should set quality no higher than the reservation level of the most dis-
criminating buyer. But then that buyer winds up worse off than if she 
had just rejected the offer out of hand (just as all informed buyers did 
in the simpler story that assumed all of them equally discriminating). 
She therefore decides not to read, and drops out of the group of in-
formed buyers. We can then find a most discriminating buyer among 
those remaining, and repeat the argument. Eventually, the group of 
145. This feature is what distinguishes the form-contract setting from other market settings 
in which some expenditure on information is rational. For instance, in financial markets there is 
ordinarily no actor in an analogous position to the contract drafter here who can set the terms of 
trade to expropriate the costs expended in market research. There are competitive market situa-
tions, however, in which similar phenomena can arise. See, e.g., Diamond, A Model of Price 
Adjustment, 3 J. EcoN. THEORY 156-68 (1971). 
146. See Katz, supra note 115. That paper also examines a variety of other issues not consid-
ered here, including the effects of applying other legal rules to the interpretation of form con-
tracts, and the relative social efficiency of such differing rules. 
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informed buyers dwindles to zero and the proposed equilibrium 
unravels. 
Put another way: the most discriminating buyer cannot find read-
ing to be an equilibrium strategy, since if sellers are maximizing she is 
sure to discover ex post a quality term that at best equals her reserva-
tion level. Hence, the set of informed buyers cannot include a most 
discriminating member. But the only way this can occur is if the set is 
empty - that is, if no buyer reads. 
The only circumstance in which the group of informed buyers 
would not unravel is where a nontrivial proportion of buyers faced no 
positive cost in becoming informed. Such buyers would still read even 
if quality were reduced to their reservation level, and sellers might 
then be induced to provide quality sufficient to get them to 
purchase.147 It seems unlikely that the size of this group would be 
empirically significant, however, and even if it were, such buyers are 
likely to be particularly unrepresentative of the population of buyers as 
a whole. Individual buyers whose costs of reading form contracts are 
zero or negative may well be unusually able to protect themselves 
against one-sided terms generally; hence the terms they would demand 
may not be optimal for the larger population. 
D. Comments on the Model 
A caveat to the foregoing analysis is in order: the argument made 
above regarding product quality does not apply to all nonprice attrib-
utes of exchange; it only applies to those nonprice attributes that are 
costly for all sellers to provide. This is what makes the buyers' and 
sellers' interests strictly adverse, so that all sellers prefer to choose 
minimal quality when buyers are uninformed. For some contract at-
tributes, however, such as the timing of delivery or provisions for com-
mercial arbitration, the interests of at least some buyers and sellers 
may not be opposed. In this case sellers could differ in the latent terms 
they prefer, and it could pay buyers to read form contracts to see 
which of these sellers they were dealing with. But for terms such as 
warranties, it is plausible to assume that increases in quality always 
increase the seller's cost. As a result, unless the buyers are specifically 
informed otherwise, they will find it rational to assume the worst 
about any latent terms rather than to read. 14 8 
147. Even this is not assured. If the group of informed buyers is small relative to the popula· 
tion of uninformed buyers, sellers might be willing to sacrifice all sales to informed buyers in 
order to obtain the cost savings from debasing quality for everyone else. 
148. It is also essential that the quality term be continuously adjustable, or at least approxi-
mately so, else it will not necessarily be the case that the seller wishes to set it no higher than the 
reservation level of the most discriminating buyer. Continuity is a plausible assumption for con-
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In addition, the outcome of the formal model is the same under the 
duty to read as it would be under a legal rule that unposed a duty to 
speak on the seller and also implied minimal quality from the seller's 
silence. Under such a regime, buyers would not be willing to pay more 
than V<> their valuation for a good of minimal quality, in response to a 
form offer. Similarly, sellers who found it worth their while to make 
the quality terms patent would have the incentive to provide optimal 
quality. Further, only those sellers with sufficiently low marketing 
costs would want to do this; the others would find it more profitable to 
remain silent and earn the profits to be earned from selling low-quality 
goods. 
In actual practice, the seller's silence is often held to imply terms 
other than those systematically most favorable to the seller, as illus-
trated, for example, by the implied warranty of merchantability for the 
sale of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code. In this circum-
stance, the seller will go to the trouble of contracting around the im-
plied quality terms if and only if the costs of doing so are less than the 
increased exchange surplus so obtained. Still, the identical result 
could be obtained under a duty to read regime that achieved the same 
default terms through separate doctrinal constraints - such as a rule 
that selling unmerchantable goods was presumptively unconscionable. 
It follows from the formal analysis that the practical differences· 
between a rule that implies a duty to read and a rule that implies a 
duty to speak may be less than legal commentators have commonly 
supposed. In particular, the aspects of the law that matter primarily 
for the equilibrium outcome are the level of latent contract terms le-
gally implied from the seller's silence under a duty to speak, and the 
minimum level of latent terms tolerated under a duty to read. It may 
not matter much which party formally bears the risk that the seller's 
terms are not communicated to the buyer, since any communication 
about them must effectively take place through the seller's efforts. 
When contract terms are latent or otherwise costly for the recipi-
ent to determine, courts or regulatory authorities might be able to im-
prove the efficiency of private bargaining by providing implied 
warranties, by refusing to give effect to at least some fine-print terms, 
and by construing instruments against the drafter. This will be the 
case if. the terms implied are more efficient than are those one-sided 
tract attributes such as warranties or liquidated damages, but other provisions may be available 
only in discrete alternatives. For example, many actual form-contract disputes arise out of 
clauses that require disputes between the parties to be settled by commercial arbitration rather 
than by the courts. Ambiguous contract language regarding which alternative is to apply, how-
ever, may make even those provisions effectively continuous. 
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terms that would be chosen by an opportunistic drafter. Whether or 
not courts are capable of actually implementing this is impossible to 
tell a priori, but requires empirical investigation. It should be stressed, 
however, that the test for whether implied warranties can improve the 
efficiency of bargaining is not whether the cost of reading is less than 
the cost of speaking. Such a comparison is misplaced, since under the 
conditions I have discussed reading is not an effective substitute for 
speaking. The appropriate test, rather, is whether the cost of reading 
is nontrivial for most recipients.149 
I believe that the reason that Baird and Weisberg missed the pre-
ceding line of analysis is that their informal and heuristic argument 
did not precisely specify the sequential structure of bargaining. As a 
consequence, they overlooked the fact that the decision to spend re-
sources becoming informed must precede the information that reveals 
whether it is worth doing so, and that the drafters of form contracts 
have the incentive to take advantage of this. But it is just this fact that 
makes reading irrational. If the cost of reading form contracts could 
be recovered after the fact, the Baird and Weisberg analysis would be 
correct. In practice, those costs generally are sunk, and hence vulner-
able to appropriation ex post by an enterprising seller who recognizes 
this ex ante. 
I do not mean to criticize Baird and Weisberg too harshly, nor do I 
think that the model presented here is the last word on form-contract 
bargaining. In my opinion, they identified the correct economic issue 
- whether giving offerors control over the terms of the contract does 
a better job of minimizing transaction costs than does a centralized 
presumptive standard - and I am more in sympathy with their ap-
proach than with that of commentators such as Rakoff and Slawson 
who focus exclusively on considerations of equity and consent in their 
criticism of legal doctrine. This is so even though my ultimate policy 
conclusions are probably closer to that of the latter authors. 150 
My main point, instead, is to emphasize the risk of using intuition 
and informal heuristics to make predictions about bargaining in com-
149. Compare Posner's suggestion that the test for enforcing fine-print clauses be "whether 
the wording, placement, or format of the clause is such as to impose excessive search costs on 
prospective customers." R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 85-86 (2d ed. 1977). 
150. Both Rakoffand Slawson, supra note 116, as well as other critics of standardized form 
contracts, might well argue that my approach attributes too much rationality to potential buyers 
and sellers, and that the dominant practical objection to such forms arises from parties' incompe-
tence in dealing with them. I am certainly prepared to accept irrationality in bargaining as a 
significant empirical phenomenon, especially in the consumer setting, although I would like to 
see some more attempts actually to measure the extent of its importance. It ought to be recog-
nized, however, that it is not necessary to rely on such factors in order to justify the policies they 
recommend. 
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plicated settings, since the precise information available to the parties 
and the sequence of decisions can matter greatly to the result. Only 
after intensive study of particular institutional facts will we acquire 
theories of bargaining that can reliably predict, and the process will 
inevitably be an incremental one. Formal analysis of the sort illus-
trated here will be a necessary tool if we are to know just which insti-
tutional facts are relevant to our purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has ranged more or less freely over a number of related 
topics in contract law, in the economic analysis of law, and in applied 
game theory. It is intended as speculative and as an argument for the 
style of analysis of which it is an example. The basic contours of its 
thesis, nonetheless, can be summarily stated: The lack of an adequate 
theory of bargaining presents a central and fundamental problem for 
the economic analysis of law. In spite of this, law-and-economics 
scholars have devoted relatively little attention to analyzing the con-
tract doctrines that determine the institutional framework within 
which negotiation takes place. Instead, they have focused their con-
sideration on the more substantive aspects of contract law at the ex-
pense of its procedural aspects. This omission on the part of these 
scholars has its counterpart in the failure of more traditional commen-
tators to examine the policy consequences of the technical rules gov-
erning contract formation with anywhere near the thoroughness with 
which they have explored the incentive properties of, for example, re-
medial doctrines. 
I argue, in contrast, that the consequences of even the most formal-
istic rules of contract formation and interpretation can be analyzed 
fruitfully by viewing bargaining as a noncooperative game, in which 
parties attempt to maximize their returns from negotiation given the 
relevant institutional constraints and the likely behavior of the other 
participants. Such an analysis requires substantial judgment and com-
mon sense for its successful execution, because of the wide variety of 
factors that determine the strategic structure of the bargaining. Once 
the techniques and styles of thought necessary for the effort are 
learned, however, they can be used to analyze both straightforward 
doctrines, which may superficially appear to serve primarily conven-
tional functions, as well as more complicated rules that are agreed to 
have important consequences for efficiency and fairness of bargaining 
- even if it is unclear from an initial perspective just what those con-
sequences might be. 
The specific models of contract bargaining presented here are in-
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tended more to illustrate the potential of the game-theoretic approach 
than. to establish any strong conclusions regarding the economic effi-
ciency of the particular doctrines considered there. Nonetheless, the 
particular models do yield specific conclusions, if we are reasonably 
restrained in our ambitions. 
Using the model of Part V, which considered the consequences of 
treating silence in the face of an offer as an acceptance, we might con-
struct plausible arguments either for or against the hypothesis that the 
prevailing doctrinal rules embodied in the Second Restatement are jus-
tified on grounds of efficiency. When bargaining takes the form of a 
single take-it-or-leave-it offer, as it sometimes does in practice, treating 
silence as acceptance increases the efficiency of negotiation when the 
cost of a response is small. Arguably, this corresponds to distinctions 
made in black-letter law. On the other hand, the efficiency criterion 
might justify extending the scope for silent acceptance substantially 
beyond the limits allowed by current doctrine. If this is the case, the 
traditional rules might be better explained by a judicial concern for the 
distributional aspects of exchange, as well as a distaste for the poten-
tial opportunism inherent under alternative regimes. 
The relative simplicity of the take-it-or-leave-it model was argua· 
bly a virtue when the model was applied to the situation of a silent 
acceptance. The resulting insights seemed roughly to correspond to 
the kinds of justifications, however cursory and conclusory, that tradi-
tionally have been offered for prevailing doctrines, even if the conven-
tional wisdom was not borne out in all respects. The model of Part 
VI, in contrast, which analyzed the duty to read in the form-contract 
context, suggests that when information is imperfect, heuristic or intu-
itive modes of thought can yield results more misleading than helpful. 
Formal analysis may be required to identify the sensitivity of the 
model to variations in its assumptions. 
For example, I argued that under a strict duty to read, notwith-
standing some superficially plausible arguments to the contrary, recip-
ients of form contracts would generally lack incentive to acquaint 
themselves with the latent terms contained within, and that as a result 
those terms would be chosen suboptimally. It follows from such an 
analysis that the efficiency of bargaining might be enhanced by legal 
rules that limit the power of drafting parties to vary contract terms 
without explicitly notifying the recipient. This line of argument was 
made possible only by precisely specifying the strategic sequence of the 
bargaining. Accordingly, an important lesson of the analysis is that 
the predictions of any theoretical account of bargaining cannot be reli-
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ably trusted until the robustness of the theory to cb.ariges in its specifi-
cations has been studied. · · · · · 
With regard to the particular doctrines I have considered, my con-
clusions must be viewed as incomplete at best. Still, a number of 
broadly general observations are possible. To begin with, the legal 
rules of contract formation and interpretation have substantive conse-
quences; they can and probably do affect parties' incentives and hence 
the efficiency and outcome of actual negotiation. Furthermore, the 
rules' substantive effects go beyond the mere provision of convention 
and coordination. As the models of both Parts V and VI demon-
strated, different rules can lead to different bargains being struck. On 
the other hand, apparently antagonistic rules, such as those imposing a 
duty to read form contracts versus a duty to disclose their contents, 
can have similar allocative effects depending on other aspects of the 
strategic structure. The similarity, however, need not grow out of a 
Coasian model of bargaining or out of any assumption of zero transac-
tion costs. 
The research program I propose is just getting started. Its implica-
tions are not yet at the stage that can be practically applied, except at 
the most general level. Judges and legislators can, however, at least 
learn to be cautious about basing their decisions. about contract forma-
tion and interpretation on facile predictions about the likely course of 
negotiation, and scholars can be more careful about encouraging them 
to do so. Private individuals with better knowledge of their particular 
strategic positions may be able to go further than this, and use the 
insights of bargaining theory to help design the frameworks in which 
they choose to contract. 
I have argued that traditional explanations of offer and acceptance 
doctrine, and of contract formation doctrine generally, fail to identify 
important incentive effects. The methods and styles of thought of non-
cooperative game theory, on the other hand, highlight such effects; 
they help to illuminate the policy consequences of the law of bargain-
ing by drawing our attention to its strategic structure. The potential 
insights to be gained transcend the narrow concerns of contract law-
yers and scholars. Since Coase's classic article and probably· before, 
we have known that the opportunity for private individuals to enter 
into contracts can critically influence the efficiency and fairness of sub-
stantive rules and regulations in every field of the faw. By devoting 
more attention to the specific branch of law that governs the proce-
dures of private ordering,· we may learn how better to use the law in 
general to promote the public interest. 
